Challenges of Space Security Governance

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan*

Keywords:  ASAT test – Geopolitics – Nuclear weapons – Outer Space Treaty (OST) – WMD

Outer space has become one of the most contested global commons today. Outer space has always been affected by great power politics but the intensity of that competition has increased in the last two decades. This is particularly evident in space security developments and in the global governance arena. With the growing geopolitical flux, space security is gaining more salience. On the global governance front, lack of consensus among the major space powers has become the most serious impediment in developing an effective outer space regime.

Increasing Salience of Space Security

A particular salience of space security is that more and more countries are pursuing their space programmes with a security agenda as a key driver. Countries that had pursued a purely civilian space programme with an almost complete focus on peaceful applications of space are reviewing and re-directing their space programmes to assume a greater role for security purposes. Many countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond have gone on to establish dedicated military space institutions and/or are developing defence space strategies that are in tune with the growing space security threats. These are clear indicators of the securitization of space. There are of course many factors such as the US-China space competition, growth of counter-space capabilities and the growing profile of private sector that have pushed these changing space security dynamics. All of this is a result of the changing geopolitical churning that is underway in the Indo-Pacific, which has emphasized a great deal on hard power including in outer space. Securitization of political and sovereignty-related territorial issues has meant that states tend to accumulate military advantage in every domain. Given that space has become so integral to conventional military operations, gaining an edge in the military space domain including through acquisition of counter-space capabilities has become more or less the norm.

To give one instance, take the case of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. After conducting multiple ASAT tests in the 1980s, both the US and the USSR had put an end to ASAT tests, acknowledging their harmful impact for the long-term sustainability of space. However, China kick-started ASAT testing, breaking a moratorium that prevailed for more than two decades, in January 2007. This gave way to more countries undertaking ASAT tests and several more have begun investing in the technology. Following the Chinese ASAT test, the US conducted its own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost) in January 2008 and India demonstrated its capability in March 2019. These are merely demonstrative of the fact that space security dynamics are changing and giving way to a more competitive environment.

An inescapable fact is that China’s test has had spin off effects with other countries conducting ASAT tests or are in pursuit of such weapons. India offers the best example in this regard. India was one of the most vocal critics of the US and the Soviet military space programmes and their ASAT tests in the 1980s and New Delhi had a steadfast civilian space programme but was compelled to rethink its space orientation following the Chinese ASAT test. The 2007 test set off a new debate within the country on how it should respond to the Chinese ASAT weapon and the implications of the China’s new weapon. Similar debates have been taking place in other countries as well including Japan, which has already invested in interceptor technology.

While ASATs are particularly destructive and considered as inherently destabilizing, there are a range of other counter-space capabilities including cyber and electronic warfare in space that are becoming a more attractive option for states should they want to interfere with or destroy other states’ satellites. Cyber and electronic warfare means have been used in many instances for more than a decade.

There are also other challenges such as emerging new actors as well as non-state players, space debris, crowded orbits triggering radio frequency interferences, issues of spectrum allocation, and problems of access to space, especially for new and emerging players. All of these make space crowded and congested, and access to space more difficult and dangerous. For many developing countries that have just begun to appreciate the use of space in changing the lives of people, getting access to space technology and expertise is still challenging, a reason why they emphasize technology sharing in the context of global governance.

Most of these problems are new. The difference comes from the fact that states have demonstrated greater inclination to develop and use offensive counter-space capabilities intended at creating temporary disruptions in other countries’ satellite operations. This trend is far more visible today than what was witnessed during the Cold War. There have been growing instances wherein cyber and electronic warfare means have been used resulting in temporary disruptions. While no ASAT weapon has yet been used to target space assets, possibly because of immediate and serious consequences, lack of response to instances of cyber and electronic warfare is normalizing bad or irresponsible behaviour. Irrespective of the damage, whether it is temporary or permanent, there must be repercussions. Absence of repercussions could encourage perpetrators to carry on with such attacks. This highlights again the need for identifying clear lines or red lines, beyond which there must be consequences. The red lines must also be disseminated in the public so that the adversaries are also clear that there is a red line they should not cross. In the absence of such articulations, what is increasingly seen is that norms that have prevailed for long are being challenged and/or are broken. The norm to not test ASAT has been broken since January 2007 when China broke a decade-long norm. Similarly, growing instances of the use of other counter-space weapons creating temporary disruptions are also violation of existing norms to not interfere in each other’s satellite operations. Unless these actions are curbed, the danger of normalizing such bad behaviour will be a bigger challenge to address at a later date.

Along with capability developments, countries are also responding in terms of new dedicated military space institutional mechanisms for better civil-military interface as well as to formulate longer term strategies and policy approaches. India went about establishing a Defence Space Agency (DSA) in October 2019 to ensure better coordination between the Department of Space, the Indian military and the Ministry of Defence. Countries such as Australia, Japan, and France have their own debates about how to further integrate space with their military. Meanwhile, other countries who already have such institutions include Russia (Russian Aerospace Defence Forces, 2011), China (People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, 2015), and the US (Space Force, 2019).

Global Governance in a Limbo

The growing space security developments point to the urgent need for new rules of the road. But global governance discussions in the last decade or so have been quite turbulent with some of the recent efforts such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGEs) not even able to produce consensus reports at the end of their deliberations. This is reflective of the fractured nature of the global politics and the great power rivalries that have become antagonistic to the point of not even being able to agree on an outcome document. The inability of all the major space powers to come together to agree on important space security challenges and possible solutions have thwarted solutions.

Outer space is not bereft of any treaties and governing measures, but these came about in a different era when the threats were of a significantly different nature. The primary concerns during the 1960s and 1970s were about nuclear weapons unlike today where non-nuclear and conventional weapons have come to occupy the center-stage. Therefore, the existing legal measures, including the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, are proving to be ineffective in tacking contemporary threats. The OST remains the fundamental treaty measure in ensuring the sanctity of outer space, but it has an important lacuna – the treaty only prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and says nothing about non-WMD weapons. Also, there are a number of new activities being undertaken and new technologies being developed, which are not considered in the OST. Activities, including on-orbit satellite servicing that essentially extends the life of a satellites by remotely repairing or refuelling satellites or technologies such as those to remove space debris, are relatively new and we need new rules to frame the parameters to undertake such activities and moderate the use of these new technologies. While these are defensive and peaceful activities, given the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, such activities are watched with a lot of concern. Finally, there are a broader set of new actors in space including industry players whose roles and responsibilities need to be clear, which help or hinder the process of rule-making. Given the growing presence of industry players in space, there have been efforts to give them a voice at the global governance debates, but this has been challenging.

Whatever form and shape new rules take, the need to identify basic tenets of responsible behaviour cannot be ignored. Given the growth in the number and types of actors, we need new norms and rules that will define and identify clear limits of responsible behaviour in space. One can explore the possibilities of reviewing the existing rules and regulations, but given the fractured nature of global politics, the feasibility of developing a common understanding in how some of the existing measures can be revised will be a non-starter. But it is clear that given the significance of outer space in our daily lives, any disruption will have a far-reaching impact in terms of multiple sectors being affected but also different regions. There are additional complications like how an over-crowded outer space can cause radio-frequency disturbances but because of the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, even a natural event or a mechanical failure could be considered by some state as an intentional attack. This kind of a scenario highlights the urgent need for crisis communications and standard operating procedures to confirm if something was a natural event or an attack.

While there have been several efforts in recent years to formulate new rules and regulations governing outer space activities, none of these have reached any fruitful conclusion. These include the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 2010, the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs), the 2018-19 as well as 2023 UN GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and the 2022-23 Open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours. It is not the lack of understanding of the threats and challenges among the major space powers that there is no progress but there are a couple of other factors that have come to affect today’s state of limbo.

For one, there are philosophical differences in how different countries approach space security challenges and possible solutions. A group of mostly Western countries with the US in the lead believe that political measures including norms of responsible behaviour such as Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) are effective measures under current international political climate when trust and confidence among states are at an all-time low. Given the fractured natured of international politics, the US and a group of countries have felt that developing legal measures may not be a feasible way for the immediate future. A second group of countries led by China and Russia have in the meantime insisted on legal measures as the only effective means to address space security challenges. This assumes that legal measures are like magic bullets and once states sign onto treaties and agreements, all the space security challenges will be dealt with. This is far from the truth as history demonstrates, especially in the Asian context. Finding a compromise between these schools of thought has not been easy.

Two, rule-making exercise has been far more difficult in recent years because unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, when two or three powers worked out what is best and everyone else fell in line, today there are more than eight major space actors and they all want to have a say in how the new rules are written. Developing a consensus in a group of nearly 100 space players is an extraordinary task. Further, the changing balance of power dynamics is unlikely to settle down in the near future, which also means the inflexible stances that major powers have taken so far will continue to hold for a reasonable period of time, making governance debates extremely challenging. Instead, what might be required and feasible is to go for smaller technical agreements that would address various challenges individually than attempt to develop a large comprehensive treaty that might not take off in the near future.


*Author is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Chandrayaan – 3: An Opportunity to Set Right the Mistake of Artemis Accords

Prof. (Dr.) Sandeepa Bhat B.*

Keywords:   Artemis Program – Chandrayaan – 2 – Common rights’ regime – Outer Space Treaty – Soft landing

Chandrayaan – 3: An Accomplishment to Cherish

Among all odds and speculations, India successfully made a soft landing on the moon on 23 August 2023. The previous experience of Chandrayaan – 2’s failure to have soft landing of the lander and the rover was haunting the entire nation till the last minute. Though Chandrayaan – 2 was successful in placing the lunar orbiter as intended, lunar landing remained an uncherished dream of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Chandrayaan – 3 could successfully land the Vikram lander and the Pragyan rover near the South Pole region of the moon. Though India is the fourth State after Russia, the United States and China to land on the moon, it is the first to land near the South Pole of the moon. The Pragyan rover has already made several discoveries that are of immense scientific significance. Hence, Chandrayaan – 3 has garnered great attention of the international community, including that of space-faring nations.

The soft landing of a space object on the moon dates back to 1966 when the erstwhile Soviet Union’s Luna 9 made the first soft landing on the moon. This triggered a race between the Soviet Union and the United States, which ultimately resulted in “one giant leap for mankind”, the first human landing on the moon in 1969. Despite the lunar landings have started more than five decades ago, technological developments in both the United States and Russia have not reached a level, which is beyond uncertainties. This is reflected in Russia’s recent failure to land Luna 25 on the moon, which was supposed to land in the South Pole region of the moon on 21 August 2023. The fact that India could able to land successfully during the same week makes the achievement special. It is also a reflection of the fact that India is now a force to be reckoned with in terms of activities on the moon and other celestial bodies.

Celestial Mining and Artemis Accords

The twenty-first century developments in the space sector are moving too much in the direction of commercialisation. We have gone beyond the use of earth orbits for commercial activities, like direct television broadcasting, remote sensing, telecommunication, navigation, etc., to grab and exploit the celestial resources. Some States have also structured their domestic laws to provide legal sanctity for celestial resource exploitation. The United States, Luxemburg, United Arab Emirates and Japan have already enacted such laws to permit celestial mining. Saudi Arabia has also shown its strong zeal in this direction by depositing a notification with the United Nations for its withdrawal from the Moon Agreement 1979. In November 2022, Japan went on to authorise iSpace, a private company, to conduct commercial activities on the moon and sell resources for profit.

While these developments were taking place in the domestic legal positions of some States, the United States has come up with a bigger plan in the form of Artemis Accords in 2020. The Artemis Accords carry 13 provisions for cooperation in the civil exploration and use of celestial bodies. They are characterised as non-binding understanding between the participating States to ensure the smooth conduct of activities on celestial bodies. Interestingly, the Artemis Accords has been signed by various authorities ranging from representatives of respective State’s space agency to some ministers or even ambassadors for different States.

The Artemis Accords are a part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA)Artemis Program, which involves a stage-by-stage journey toward celestial bodies. In this connection, NASA has successfully launched Artemis 1, which involved the exploration around the moon and return to earth to ensure that the technology is adequate enough for safe journey to lunar orbit. The next two Artemis missions are intended to perform human lunar flyby and human landing respectively. The Artemis Program also dreams of constructing a lunar orbital station- lunar ‘Gateway’, and a self sustaining base on the moon- ‘Artemis Base Camp’.

An Indian Mistake

After the Artemis Accords were signed by the initial signatories, the efforts to increase the number of participating States got intensified. Two other major space-faring nations, Russia and China, have rejected to concede the Artemis Accords. Instead, they have teamed up to have a parallel joint project in the form of the International Lunar Research Station. India kept itself away from the Artemis Accords for nearly three years. However, after a wait and watch game, it became the twenty seventh signatory to the Artemis Accords on 21 June 2023 when the Indian ambassador to the United States, Mr. Taranjit Singh Sindhu, signed it on behalf of India.

Keeping aside any political consideration, this is a move that India should have never played from the legal standpoint. The Artemis Accords and its umbrella cover of the Artemis Program are in direct violation of international space treaties’ obligations. Though there are multiple contradictions with the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, the author would like to highlight the most significant of all for the purpose of this blog piece, which is indisputably the violation of the principle of non-appropriation.

The Outer Space Treaty is the reflection of the common rights’ regime, which originates from the universal understanding that space resources are bounties of nature and everyone should have rights in them. The need for carrying out the exploration and the use of outer space and celestial bodies for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, along with equality of access to all areas and freedom of scientific investigation to all, stand as the foundational principles in this regard under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty carries forward the elements of common rights’ regime by prohibiting national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies “by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Despite the common rights’ regime is taken to the next level under the Moon Agreement 1979 with the incorporation of the common heritage of mankind, its practical implication has taken a backseat due to the limited ratification of the Moon Agreement. 

These principles of common rights’ regime have taken shape in space law due to the relentless efforts of the third world States.[1] With the failure of the Moon Agreement, Article II read with Article I of the Outer Space Treaty remained as the sanctum sanctorum of the common rights’ regime in space law. Sections 9 and 10 of the Artemis Accords pose serious challenges to these principles of common rights. Section 9 stipulates the preservation of outer space heritage without outlining how encompassing such a right of preservation will be. This is dangerous as the measures taken in preserving space heritages will be subjective and might result in creating monopolistic rights in contravention of common rights’ regime.

Section 10 is of greater concern as it advocates for laying hands on celestial resources for commercial exploitation. It is based on the wrong presumption that the Outer Space Treaty does not deal with celestial resources. The legal uncertainty of Section 10 is evident in the provision itself as the drafters stipulate this as not a contravention of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. It is unbecoming of any international instrument, legal or otherwise, to include such an unwarranted justification for a provision unless there exists an inconsistency. Commercial utilisation of celestial resources by select few States under the garb of the Artemis Accords undoubtedly amounts to national appropriation by “use” or by “other means” contrary to the essence of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. This is also at odds with India’s historic stand against individual appropriation evident in its United Nations deliberations during 1970s. It is significant to note here that along with Egypt and Nigeria, India had opposed the United States’ position on resource exploitation in 1974.[2] Now, signing Artemis Accords indicate a U-turn in the Indian assertion of third world approach, and more dangerously, acceding the US imperialism.

What Next?

This is not the time for repenting on whatever has happened. This is the time for carrying forward by accepting the current position of India being a part of the Artemis Accords. We have to assess and revaluate the Artemis Accords as well as its bigger counterpart of Artemis Program to bring them in tune with the common rights’ regime. The most significant step in this direction is to shift the spirit of bilateralism or plurilateralism of the Artemis Accords to multilateralism by involving all States in negotiating an acceptable regime for celestial resources. For this, bridging the gap between Artemis Accords and Lunar Station project as well as taking the confidence of developing and less developed States are crucial. We should take lessons from the unilateralism of the United States in the deep seabed exploitation to collectively condemn the extension of it to celestial resources. Our achievement of Chandrayaan – 3 should be viewed as a tool for having an independent say to uphold the integrity ofthe common rights’ regime in international space law.


* Professor of Law, Director – Centre for Aviation and Space Laws, The WB National University of Juridical Sciences, Salt Lake City, Kolkata.

References:

[1] Robert J. Griffiths, ‘From the Ocean Floor to Outer Space: The Third World and Global Commons Negotiations’, Journal of Third World Studies , Vol. 9, No. 2, 1992, pp. 375 – 389.

[2] Stephen D. Mau, ‘Equity, the Third World and the Moon Treaty’, Suffolk Transnational Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1984, pp. 221 – 258 at p. 250.

Cislunar Space Strategy in Light of the Outer Space Treaty

Thomas Paul Kanatt*

Keywords:   Appropriation – DARPA – Human presence – Militarize – Outer Space Treaty

The Artemis Accords, which got publicized in 2020, marked a new phase in the United States space policy with the mission of sending crewed missions to the Moon and beyond. Whilst many debates had arisen regarding this Program, the United States was looking for the next big thing in space to assert its supremacy and leadership in space. In pursuance of this, the government released a “National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy,” (NCST) in November 2022, which consists of a document that would guide the actions of the US Government in advancing science, exploration and economic development activities in the Cislunar space.

This blog seeks to critically examine this strategy in light of the internationally accepted Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies commonly called as the Outer Space Treaty

Essence of the NCST

Cislunar space is the space beyond Earth’s geosynchronous orbit which is under the gravitation influence of both the Earth and the Moon. This includes the Lagrange points, the trajectories utilizing these regions and the Lunar surface.  

The Cislunar space is of critical importance for developing space infrastructure, space resource mining, lunar exploration and more importantly for establishing a domain for national security. It also offers an opportunity to enable crewed exploration to Mars and beyond. In fact, the U.S. Government estimates that the level of human activity in Cislunar space over the next decade could exceed everything that has happened there between 1957 and today, combined. The ultimate aim of these objectives is to achieve development in Cislunar Space with the leadership of U.S. playing a central role.  

With this strategy in mind, the document devises 4 main objectives in the early years of Cislunar growth:

  1. Support research and development to enable long term growth in Cislunar space. 
  2. Expand international science and technology cooperation in Cislunar space.
  3. Extend U.S. space situational awareness capabilities into Cislunar space. 
  4. Implement Cislunar communications, positioning, navigation and timing capabilities with scalable and interoperable approaches.

Intent to Militarize

As part of their aim to enable an enduring human presence in Cislunar space and resource utilization in Moon, the US is looking to develop capabilities like manufacturing of components from in-situ materials, autonomous assembly of structures in space and construction of structures that maximize the use of in-situ materials. On the same note, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had released the Novel Orbital Moon Manufacturing, Materials, and Mass Efficient Design (NOM4D) program, which seeks to establish off-earth manufacturing by producing structures in outer space. Therefore, in essence, the NOM4D Program by DARPA fulfils the first objective of the Cislunar space objectives of supporting emerging technologies to enable long term growth in Cislunar space.

However, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty advocates for using the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. It also prohibits the establishment of any military bases, installations and fortifications on celestial bodies. DARPA is an agency of the US Department of Defense for the development of technologies to be used by military forces to enhance national security. Therefore, any endeavor by this agency will only be viewed by other countries as a statement of intent to militarize the moon, thereby, violating Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. This makes the NOM4D program inconsistent with the country’s commitments under the Treaty.

Claims of Appropriation 

As part of the US Government’s plan to enable long term growth in Cislunar space, the US Government intends to partner up with private entities, many of whom in this regard have already published their objectives for operating in Cislunar Space. The provisions of the NCST endorse the government to build sustainable habitats on planetary surfaces to support an enduring human presence. In pursuit of this, private companies like United Launch Alliance have already laid out their vision for Cislunar Space development, which focuses on constructing human habitats not just for scientific research but also for tourism objectives.

However, the US Government’s plans of operating in the Cislunar space traverse the scope of the basic intent of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits any claim of appropriation. In this context, the word appropriation relates to a taking which involves more than a temporary or casual occupation of land. The intent of the US Government in partnering with private entities to build a permanent settlement on a planetary body for its own use constitutes a claim of appropriation, thereby violating Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 

Benefit and Interest of all Countries

The exploits of the US government additionally violate Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which mandates the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. Article I also guarantees free access to all areas of celestial bodies to all States. By appropriating property for itself and by building long term habitats, the US is effectively excluding access for other countries over those areas. This further bolsters the argument of appropriation against the United States in violation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.

As asserted by Rene Mankiewicz, anything taken from the Moon has to be used for the benefit and interest of the whole of mankind and not just that of a single nation. Objective 1 of NCST facilitates the development of lunar surface technologies and resource assessment technologies to enable an enduring human presence on the Moon. However, there has been no mention of sharing the benefits with other nations through such activities. Even though an argument could be made that Objective 2 of the NCST assuages this concern by facilitating engagement with other countries, a careful reading of the document suggests otherwise. Objective 2 specifically mentions pursuing engagement with other nations only in certain areas of science and technology like debris mitigation, collision avoidance and flight safety. Moreover, past practice shows that ownership would eventually be asserted over resources that are extracted by the United States from the Moon. Such individual claims of ownership do not satisfy the requirements under Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty in terms of carrying on exploration of the Moon for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, thereby violating the Treaty.

Underlying Scheme

The basic purpose behind the NCST is projected as the advancement of science and exploration in the Cislunar area, however a deeper reading of the objectives would reveal otherwise. Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty only sanctions exploration and use of lunar resources for scientific investigation; however, the present objectives of the NCST go far beyond the use for scientific purposes, and extend to exploitation of the resources for long term habitation and other operations on the Moon. As part of this strategy, the US government envisions other private entities operating in the Cislunar Space and as a part of its longer term goal, it foresees a ‘Cislunar Ecosystem’. This ‘Cislunar ecosystem’ involves utilization of reserves on the moon as resources for extraction and for supporting other activities that are of a permanent nature on the moon.

The above discussion indicates that the underlying scheme of the NCST does not respect the essence of both Article I and II of the Outer Space Treaty. Since the aim would eventually be to enable a long term human presence, supported by the utilization of resources on the moon and construction of permanent structures and habitats, the respect for benefits and interest principles and non-appropriation principle is difficult to prove.

Concluding Remarks

Cislunar space offers a lot of opportunity and potential for future growth; however, any activity pursued there must be carefully monitored to be in compliance with treaty obligations of States. The NCST poses serious questions on the compliance of the United States’ obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. Hence, the objectives should be streamlined and amended to ensure that the partnership with private entities does not result in contravention of international legal obligations.

* Pursuing BA/LLB (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur.

References:

  1. Virgiliu Pop, ‘Appropriation in outer space: The relationship between land ownership and sovereignty on the celestial bodies’, Space Policy, Vol. 16, Issue 4, 2000, pp. 275 – 282.
  2. Mankiewicz R., ‘Interventions with respect to permanent stations on the Moon’, Proceedings of the Eleventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1968, p. 163.
  3. Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, S’pace Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive’, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 73, Issue 1, 2008, pp. 37 – 78.
  4. Marc-Andre Chavy-Macdonald, et al., ‘The cis-lunar ecosystem — A systems model and scenarios of the resource industry and its impact’, Acta Astronautica, Vol. 188, 2021, pp. 545 – 558.

Beyond Borders: Applicability and Contours of Criminal Law in Space

Tanmay Mehta[*]

Keywords:   Criminal law -Extraterritoriality – IGA – International Space Station – Outer Space Treaty 

Even though space law is itself an evolving field, one field that may present (when applied in space) myriad complex challenges due to the unique nature of its applicability is criminal law. Till now, the jurisprudence of space law has not been confronted with a matter which has tested the applicability and contours of criminal law in space. It is also interesting to note that no one has yet been formally charged, let alone convicted, for the commission of a crime in space. However, as space becomes increasingly accessible and more open to the private sector, we are bound to see instances of unlawful activities in space too. For example, in 2019, a NASA astronaut allegedly hacked the bank account of her estranged spouse while she was aboard the International Space Station. The claims against the astronaut, however, were later found to be false. States at the individual level have also been making an effort to cover this uncovered field. An example of this is Canada’s Budget Bill of 2022 which contained provisions to crack down on space crimes. The Bill, inter alia, extended the applicability of criminal law to outer space by providing that “a Canadian crew member who, during a space flight, commits an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable offence is deemed to have committed that act or omission in Canada, if that act or omission is committed(a) on, or in relation to, a flight element of the Lunar Gateway;(b) on any means of transportation to or from the Lunar Gateway; or(c) on the surface of the Moon.” With this brief background and general overview, this write-up explores the hitherto not much-explored area concerning the applicability of criminal law in space in the following sections. 

Application of Criminal Law and Jurisdictional Ambiguity in Space

One of the major issues relating to the applicability and functioning of criminal law in space is the nature of the law itself. Criminal law, by its very nature in the traditional setting, is territorial and is applicable only within the national frontiers of a State. Thus, determining the applicable law and jurisdiction in cases concerning a field which has no boundaries and is not subject to the territorial rights of States may prove to be problematic and require consideration of a variety of issues. The extraterritorial application of criminal law and the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in space are in search of a proper connecting factor so that a relevant State law and jurisdiction can be applied. Scholars are divided on using either nationality of the offender or victim or registration of space objects as the connecting factor to apply criminal law and exercise jurisdiction. The nationality-based approach proposes that, regardless of where the space object is registered, criminal law should be enforced depending on the nationality of the individuals participating in the illegal act. This strategy adheres to the established idea that a nation’s laws are applicable to all of its residents, wherever they may be. In other words, this approach adheres to one of the most basic principles of classical international law—that international law would not interfere with the relationship between a sovereign state and its nationals. However, in cases involving multi-national space missions, this approach may present difficulties in determining jurisdictional issues. Moreover, there is also a divide between the active personality and passive personality principles for applying nationality as a connecting factor since the former goes by the nationality of the offender and the latter advocates for the nationality of the victim.

The registration-based approach, on the other hand, suggests that criminal law be implemented based on the registration of the space object participating in the illegal action. If this approach were to be followed, the criminal act would be under the jurisdiction of the country of registration of the space object on which the crime is committed. In disputes involving space objects owned by commercial corporations or multinational organisations, proponents of this approach argue that it offers clearer rules and is the least controversial principle for the determination of applicable law and jurisdiction. In other words, this approach may be better suited for the present purposes because space missions frequently involve astronauts and employees from multiple countries. However, there may be jurisdictional gaps in situations where criminal behaviour is directly connected to a specific person or group of people rather than the space object itself. Further, this approach might not fully address circumstances in which criminal activities are carried out by parties outside the registered space object, such as cyber-attacks on spacecraft or distant operations impacting space missions. Traditional ideas of territorial jurisdiction may not be adequate in these situations to prosecute the offenders. The lack of legal precedents further exacerbates the jurisdictional ambiguity surrounding unlawful conduct in space. In addition to this, we must not forget that the field of space law is still relatively new and continually developing, and due to the lack of established legal frameworks, decision-making becomes more difficult.

Existing Legal Framework

In the interim, till a comprehensive framework is developed for the purpose of regulating criminal activities in space, we may make use of the existing frameworks to decide issues relating to applicable law and jurisdiction. For this purpose, we may reconcile and interpret the Intergovernmental Agreement on the International Space Station (hereinafter “IGA”) and specific provisions of the Outer Space Treaty in a manner that would allow us to determine the questions concerning criminal activities in space. Unfortunately, neither IGA nor Outer Space Treaty addresses the question of applicable law separately rather, they confine themselves to jurisdictional issues. 

IGA provides detailed rules concerning jurisdictional issues in relation to criminal misconduct in space. In cases involving individuals from the same nation, Article 22(1) of the IGA specifically states that parties to the said agreement may “exercise criminal jurisdiction over personnel in or on any flight element who are their respective nationals.” In cases where the misconduct “….(a) affects the life or safety of a national of another Partner State or (b) occurs in or on or causes damage to the flight element of another Partner State”, IGA provides for a consultative process under Article 22(2). It provides that the affected Partner State may request a consultation with the Partner State to whom the alleged perpetrator belongs concerning their respective “prosecutorial interests.” It further provides that the affected Partner State may exercise criminal jurisdiction against the alleged perpetrator if the Partner State whose national is the alleged perpetrator fails to either “(1) concur in such exercise of criminal jurisdiction, or (2) provide assurances that it will submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.” Article 22(4) further mandates that each Partner State has to cooperate and assist other Partner States in relation to misconduct in orbit. 

In addition to the IGA, Outer Space Treaty also provides under Article VIII that the jurisdiction and control over space objects and personnel thereof shall lie with the nation on whose registry that object is registered. This combines personal jurisdiction with quasi-territorial jurisdiction on the basis of registration as the connecting factor. Interestingly, it does not consider nationality even in conferring personal jurisdiction over the personnel of space objects.

The above discussion on IGA and the Outer Space Treaty shows how a mixed approach needs to be followed concerning issues relating to the scope and contours of criminal law in space. It requires us to follow the nationality principle in conjunction with the principle relating to the registration of objects. However, this may not essentially work in the long run as there is every possibility of conflict between nationality and registration as connecting factors in future space crimes. The framework discussed above, with reconciling connecting factors, may be used as an inspiration to develop more comprehensive rules and guidelines governing criminal misconduct in space. This is not an easy task, given the unwillingness of States to involve themselves in the consultative processes to come to an agreement on their respective prosecutorial interests. 

Conclusion

As space activities continue to advance, the need for a more robust and comprehensive legal framework becomes increasingly evident. Establishing a dedicated body of space criminal law, informed by international cooperation and consensus, is crucial for addressing current ambiguity in the determination of applicable law and jurisdiction. Additionally, international collaboration among space-faring nations is essential to create a cohesive legal framework that ensures accountability and upholds justice in the ever-expanding frontier of outer space. Addressing this issue requires a collective effort from the international community to develop a comprehensive and coherent legal framework that caters specifically to the challenges of space crimes. Only through cooperation, innovation, and dedication we can create a system that ensures that justice prevails in the uncharted and rapidly evolving frontier of outer space.


[*]The author is a Junior Associate at the Chamber of Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India. The author would like to thank Prof (Dr) Sandeepa Bhat for his valuable feedback and suggestions. 

Is the Outer Space an Outlet for Tax Evasion?

Twesha Karnani*

Keywords: National Appropriation – Outer Space Treaty – Residential Status – Sovereignty

Introduction

Private space exploration is becoming common, and opportunities for extraterrestrial operations have grown considerably. A glimpse of the issues arising from taxing outer space activities is seen in taxing the activities conducted in digital space. The space sector generates an income of $350 billion and it is expected to jump to $1 trillion by 2040. It is important to tax those involved in this sector especially if such activities are for personal benefit and not for the advancement of mankind and science. On this issue, US Congressman Earl Blumenauer had planned to introduce the Securing Protections Against Carbon Emissions (SPACE) Tax Act. He believes that “space exploration isn’t a tax-free holiday for the wealthy. Just as normal Americans pay taxes when they buy airline tickets, billionaires who fly into space to produce nothing of scientific value should do the same, and then some”.

Typically, the levy of tax has been based on the place of residence of the individual, a company’s place of operation or where a property is situated. However, when it is difficult to prove an individual’s or entity’s existence physically, assessing taxes becomes challenging. Even though, while assessing taxes in such scenarios, the basic principles of taxation law must be kept in mind, the present regime might be insufficient to provide for the rapid growth that is taking place in this sector. 

The levy of tax in the space sector can be on a variety of operations such as services of satellites, astronauts staying aboard the International Space Station (ISS) and space tourism. It has been opined that future legislation in this area must be based on the laws that govern the high seas.

This write-up discusses how the levy of taxes on the services provided by satellites, the income of astronauts or other outer space activities pose to be an issue. Furthermore, a prospective suitable tax regime is also briefly discussed. 

The issue with levying tax on satellite services

The most notable instance of space technology that causes problems for tax officials is the usage of satellites. It is challenging to establish a proper way of taxing because of the ambiguous character of such services. The primary issue with satellites is that since they orbit the Earth, they will be over more than one country while providing their services to a third country. The “footprint” of the satellite cannot be considered the place of business of the satellite operator. From the point of view of direct tax, the residential status of the satellite operator is a critical component and not the satellite’s actual location.

Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states that outer space “is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”. This doctrine of non-appropriation places restrictions on those who want to profit from space activities. Since States cannot claim sovereignty over outer space, the question which arises is whether imposing and collecting taxes could possibly violate the non-appropriation doctrine as taxes are based on the sovereign territorial rights of the States. This is something which needs to be determined in order to decide whether outer space activities could be taxed. 

In Communications Satellite Corporation v. Franchise Tax Board, satellites were operating in the geostationary orbit. The owners of the satellites, who were located outside of California, established an earth base that gathered signals for transmission to other carriers. Claiming the satellite was utilised within the state, the California Court of Appeal supported the incorporation of the satellite’s worth in the property for allocating California income tax. Nevertheless, this was reliant on the earth station’s presence because, without it, California wouldn’t be connected to the satellites’ functions in space.

In Asia Satellite Communications Co. Ltd. v. DIT, the Court held that an important component in determining how to tax such situations is through thoroughly analysing the technical operations of the satellites.

Where do Astronauts pay taxes?

Scott Kelly, the astronaut, lived in space for almost a year. Does this mean he didn’t have to pay taxes since he was not a resident of the United States or for that matter even the Earth? Even though he orbited the Earth every 90 minutes, he didn’t visit any country since the sovereign airspace does not stretch out to outer space. In such scenarios too, due to the lack of laws, the traditional principles of taxation need to be adhered to. This situation is identical to seafarers rendering their services on a ship. However, one must establish the nature of employment abroad, whether the International Space Station falls under the ambit of a “ship” or a “vessel”. In the Indian scenario, hypothetically, the residential status of the astronaut will be considered based on the number of days they stay aboard the ISS and physically outside the boundaries of India.

How should outer space activities be taxed?

The method of taxing outer space activities can be like taxing activities in digital space. It’s possible to argue that the inadequacies of tax regimes based on residential status have been made apparent by cross-border online services. To combat this, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is spearheading initiatives to fundamentally redefine the global tax regime. Space taxes may eventually follow an identical course. However, this does entail a risk since individual nations would implement unilateral measures, creating an unstable and challenging tax environment for the space industry. Using residential status for calculating the amount of tax to be levied is not the right step in the case of space activities even though it is considered to be of central importance to this sector.  This is due to the fact that firstly, space does not have boundaries and the Outer Space Treaty prohibits states from claiming sovereign power in outer space. Secondly, there are many ambiguities when it comes to applying the same residence-based tax system in this scenario which will lead to more problems. 

An alternative model for taxing outer space activities would be through the existence of a voluntary tax system between participating nations. These nations can choose to invest in the advancements of space technology in order to be able to reap the benefits that arise out of it. This could make it possible for new countries to engage and profit from space activities while also taking into account the legitimate interests of those countries and commercial players who currently fund these activities solely. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that a voluntary tax system for space activities could generate issues of equity, as certain nations will gain from such activities even if the investment made by it is low in comparison with others. For such a framework to prosper, there must be the existence of a universal organisation administering space tax. This function can also fall under the functions of the World Bank. 

Conclusion

Through this write-up, it can be understood that outer space is not an outlet for tax evasion. The lack of a proper tax regime does not imply that taxes need not be paid appropriately. Although governments and organisations, both domestic and global, continue to commit a significant amount of money and time to the expanding space sector, there has been less focus on making sure that tax regimes keep up with it. In complex situations such as these, the basic principles of taxation law must be kept in mind. However, it is challenging to do so since space does not have any boundaries and nations are prohibited to establish sovereignty in outer space. Even though outer space lies outside the boundaries of any country, individuals are liable to pay taxes for the income earned in space. It can be concluded that there are many gaps and a lack of a proper tax system when it comes to outer space activities.  Therefore, a multilateral approach must be adopted to tackle this issue. There shouldn’t be a zero-tax system being followed in zero gravity. The lack of adequate laws can allow people to find loopholes to reduce their tax liabilities. However, the space sector is in no way a sector that is a channel for tax evasion.

*Student at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

References

Diane Riordan, ‘The Challenge of Taxing Business in Outer Space’, Challenge , Vol. 47, No. 6, 2004, pp 109-116.


Liberalization of the Indian Space Sector: Private Participation and Legal Challenges

Rongeet Poddar*

Keywords:      Authorization – Draft Space Activities Bill, 2017 – IN-SPACe – Outer Space Treaty – Supervision

Introduction

The Indian government is keen to ramp up private sector participation in space activities, following affirmation from the Union Cabinet. The principal science advisor of the Indian government has recently underlined the intention to have greater involvement from private players, acknowledging the Indian Space Research Organization’s (ISRO) limited capacity. While ISRO has historically played a pivotal role towards advancing India’s space programme, the private sector was restricted to a collaborative role in the manufacturing sphere.

Private players are now expected to actively engage in launching satellites and offering myriad services that would facilitate various domains such as agriculture by enhanced accuracy in climate patterns, increase connectivity capacity and offer an impetus for businesses in the long run. Moreover, the exploration of private avenues is likely to allow the premier government space agency to devote its attention solely to specialized research programmes. The government has also created leeway for a foreign investment stimulus – 100% foreign direct investment has been permitted in the sphere of satellite operation. It is expected that such liberalization would further augment India’s burgeoning capacity in the space activities domain.

From a legal standpoint, the challenge before policymakers has been to strike a balance between offering a fillip to privatization in the space sector and also having a concrete regulatory framework in place. Laws must be designed not only to ensure compliance to international treaties but must also mirror global best practices. Since commercial entities will be keen to maximize profits to recoup the substantial investments that space projects demand, it is imperative that compliance costs are minimized. Therefore, the legal architecture regulating space activities is also expected to be amenable to business interests.

Recent privatization trends in the space sector

The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre (‘IN-SPACe)has also been set up to enable private enterprises to utilize government infrastructure for conducting satellite launches and providing a myriad range of services in the process. As an autonomous institution functioning under the aegis of the Department of Space, the IN-SPACe has also been entrusted with regulating the involvement of private entities. Recently, two Indian enterprises have received the green signal from IN-SPACe for their respective payload launches.

At the same time, the Draft Space Activities Bill, 2017 (‘Draft Bill’) had been envisaged, owing to the pressing need for having a domestic space law. Despite the advent of IN-SPACe as a regulatory institution, there has not been sufficient progress in the legislative sphere. Interestingly, even as the present dispensation in India appears to be more receptive to the prospect of private sector engagement in outer space activities, the legal regime appears to be at a nascent stage.

As acknowledged in the ‘explanatory note’ to the Draft Bill, the government is cognizant of the fact that if space exploration has to be pursued on a commercial scale, a licensing framework has to be established for authorizing private forays into space. In fact, a robust national space law is seen as the ideal precursor to private participation. It can provide investors a sense of certainty as they seek to leverage funding for satellite operations.

While IN-SPACe maybe the genesis of a private space activity ecosystem, it has to be backed by a concrete space law, as is the case in advanced space-faring nations of the West. The overarching tendency towards privatization in the explanatory note has been flagged since it places commercial use of space at a higher pedestal over India’s treaty commitments; this approach is viewed as a slippery slope. Even though the Draft Bill is regarded as a welcome move, the inadequacies remain far too intractable to overlook.

International commitments

Being a party to all major international treaties governing outer space, barring the Moon Agreement, India is obligated to adhere to treaty obligations. It must be noted that Article VI of the historic Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (‘Outer Space Treaty’) puts the onus on state parties to bear responsibility for “national activities in outer space.” A mandate has been imposed on states to create an apparatus for supervision. Secondly, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty attributes liability to state parties for damage caused by space objects launched from their territory. Thus, the accountability for private space activities has effectively been thrust on state parties.

International efforts, spearheaded by the International Law Association, for pinpointing a set of uniform global regulation standards also culminated in a model law adopted by the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Under the model, national legislation proposed, private sector participation in space activities would be subject to a strict standard of scrutiny undertaken by states domestically based on ‘authorization’ and ‘supervision.’ Its regulatory design is backed up by sanctions regime under which authorization suspension is rendered permissible.

Additionally, a provision has been incorporated for environmental impact assessment of private space activities. The model law necessitates the adoption of a debris mitigation framework. There is also an avenue for the government to pursue claims against a private entity in the event where compensation has to be paid by the state to a third party for the damage caused by the private space actor. Even as the Draft Bill in India claims to have utilized the ILA model law as a blueprint, there are several pitfalls in the proposed law which have been highlighted in recent scholarly works.

Scrutinizing the Draft Space Activities Bill, 2017

The applicability of the Draft Bill is restricted to enterprises in the private sector which are registered or incorporated in India. The bill does not provide clarity as to what will happen if foreign firms seek to participate in the Indian space sector in a collaborative capacity with the private sector. Joint ventures undertaken by Indian firms with foreign investors could be operating in a legal vacuum. Moreover, it may be an uphill task to determine a space object of ‘Indian origin’ to which the proposed legislation would be applicable – the Draft Bill is silent on the critical question.

The definition of ‘space activity’ in the Draft Bill is further shrouded in ambiguity. Its residuary segment potentially brings in research or allied activities within the fold of space activity. The wide ambit of the definition is also likely to cover the manufacturing sector as it is inclusive of space objects ‘procurement’. The expansive nature of the clause appears to transcend the understanding of space activity in the ILA model law which encompasses “other activities essential for the launch, operation, guidance and entry of space objects.”

The power of supervision and regulation have been conferred upon the Central Government. In addition to policy making pertaining to outer space activities, the government can issue licenses for commercial space activity and also monitor compliance with safety standards prescribed. Since the Draft Bill had identified the need for a ‘regulatory mechanism’, it is evident that IN-SPACe is the concerned agency that will play the role of an autonomous agency with regulatory functions.

As outlined in Chapter III of the bill, the license issued by the government is a sine qua non for commercial space activity – its object is to ensure compliance to India’s treaty commitments. Interestingly, leeway has been provided for conduct of space activity in the Draft Bill even without authorization as long as it does not contravene India’s international obligations. The Central government has been designated as the sole authority which can provide such an exemption, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. However, this provision may be singled out for criticism as it could be prone to misuse. Since, the Bill is silent about the terms of exemption, it could provide untrammelled impunity to operators of space activity in the private sector. Thus, there is an urgent need to rethink the exemption clause.

While the licensing terms in the Draft Bill have a ubiquitous reference to preventing “adverse damage or pollution to the environment,” it does not insist upon a comprehensive environmental impact assessment for space activities based on precautionary principle. It remains to be seen whether the lacuna in the draft is addressed in the near future. On the other hand, the Central government’s blanket ownership right on “intellectual property right developed, generated or created onboard a space object in outer space” is further likely to hinder private sector engagement. Likewise, the incorporation of an access and benefits sharing clause as a part of the regulatory mechanism is also likely to be a cause for concern. Lastly, scholars have highlighted how several aspects of commercial activity in outer space such as resource extraction or tourism have been ignored in the Draft Bill.

Conclusion

Despite its shortcomings, the Draft Space Activities Bill, 2017 was a welcome move. It underscored the government’s tacit recognition that the space sector needs regulatory intervention before the private sector transitions to prominent stakeholders from marginal players restricted to manufacturing activities. In its current form, the Draft Bill has several contentious provisions, as identified, and remains a work in progress. There is scope for further engagement with the critical stakeholders for the creases to be ironed out.

With the IN-SPACe already instituted as a facilitator for stimulating private investment and participation in space activities, the government remains keen for governing non-governmental engagement in the space sector. It must also remain cognizant of fulfilling India’s international obligations in this regard. Besides adhering to the mandate of international treaties, the new law has the enviable task of ushering in a regulatory environment that is responsive to the demands of investors who seek to offer a boost to India’s space sector. At the same time, environmental concerns and public safety issues cannot be relegated to the margins.


* LL.M. graduate with International Law specialization.

Military Use of Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites

Agniva Das* and Dr. Amol Deo Chavhan**

Keywords: Commercial Satellites – Militarisation – Remote Sensing – Satellite Imagery – Outer Space Treaty

Background

On 1 March 2022, Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov sent out an appeal to most of the world’s commercial satellite companies via Twitter urging them to help Ukraine by providing satellite imagery for military purposes. The Minister urged eight of the world’s leading earth observation satellite companies to provide high-resolution satellite imagery to monitor Russian troop advancements. Companies like Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs have openly published the images to the media, which is how the world has been witnessing the menace and destruction caused by the war in real time. Moreover, on 2 March 2022, Elon Musk in a tweet acknowledged his direct support to Ukraine by promising to provide better internet connectivity by activating the internet terminals of his satellite internet constellation – Starlink. When civilian or commercial satellites are used for military purposes, it raises serious concerns regarding whether the satellites are to be considered as civilian or military assets.

This is not the first time that civilian or commercial satellites have been used during a military conflict for military purposes. Operation Enduring Freedom, alternatively known as the Global War on Terror, was the first instance when the military relied heavily on commercial satellite space assets like high resolution satellite imagery and satellite communications.

Remote sensing has been used as a mode of surveillance for centuries. Even before the First World War, remote sensors have been utilised by attaching them to hot air balloons and flying them over target cities.  Now, however, specialised satellites with variegated capabilities are being used for remote sensing. These include but are not limited to optical satellites, radar imaging satellites, ultraviolet and infrared imagery satellites, and signal intercepting communication satellites. Remote sensing has several advantages over any other forms of reconnaissance as it can provide high-resolution imagery of not only visible light but also other wavelengths of light. This information can be further used for monitoring enemy troop advancements, strategic planning, and tactical threat assessment.

With the explosive growth of science and technology and the reliance of military activities on the same, the demand for better connectivity and higher-resolution imagery was beyond the military’s ability to fulfil with military owned satellite technologies. The biggest military in the world, the United States Military has since then heavily relied on commercial satellite assets for military use.

Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States have dedicated billions of dollars for the renovation of their military satellite technology for the swift utilisation of these assets by the UK, US and Canadian forces in the ‘Global War on Terror’. Infact, in the year 2006 the United States National Space Policy which was authorised by then President George W. Bush directed all governmental departments and agencies to use, purchase and even modify the U.S. commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum extent to meet the United States Government requirements and make them cost-effective.

Legalities

Such instances have raised further questions regarding the legalities of the militarisation of commercial or civilian satellites, especially with respect to remote sensing, which has been widely debated in recent years. 

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Outer Space Treaty, provides certain general provisions for the peaceful exploration and use of space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law. However, it does not provide any specific provision to tackle the legal problems surrounding remote sensing.

It is certainly difficult to understand what kind of military applications fall under activities that are “for the benefit and interest of all countries” as mentioned in the Outer Space Treaty, as any military activity by one country can be seen as an act of aggression by another country. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, thus, creates a loose obligation that all activities should not be ‘harmful’ in the general sense as opposed to being ‘beneficial’. However, it does not provide any clarity on whether placing commercial remote sensing assets with military capabilities in earth orbit is in the common interest of all countries.

Article III of the Outer Space Treaty dictates that all outer space activities shall be conducted in accordance with international law which shall include the Charter of the United Nations and it shall be in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding. Since the United Nations Charter overrides rights or obligations under any other treaty, the Outer Space Treaty must be read in consonance with the United Nations Charter. In the interest of maintaining international cooperation, Article 2(4)  of the United Nations Charter provides that countries should refrain from threatening and using force against the territorial integrity of any country, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing into orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and seeks the complete demilitarisation of celestial bodies. However, when read in unison with the United Nations Charter, it can be understood that no restrictions are imposed on any other military activities like remote sensing or satellite communications.

Article IV further dictates that the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used for ‘peaceful uses’ by all State parties. Fortification, setting up military establishments and testing of weapons are strictly forbidden. What the Outer Space Treaty fails to address is the clear meaning of ‘peaceful uses’ and what kinds of activities fall under this definition. Moreover, the provision provides for peaceful use of the Moon and other celestial bodies but fails to mention that outer space as a whole is ought to be used for peaceful purposes and not only for celestial bodies.

The question that arises here is whether using military capabilities like remote sensing of other countries by using commercial assets violates or infringes the rights or territorial integrity of those countries. If we were to consider the principles of air and maritime law, it is clear that reconnaissance or espionage is permissible on the high seas but not in the territorial waters or the territorial airspace of countries targeted for surveillance.

The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (the “Remote Sensing Principles”) which was adopted by the United Nations in 1986 creates more confusion in this regard as Principle I of the same states that “remote sensing activities by countries shall be conducted to improve natural resources management, land use and the protection of the environment.” This provision leaves room for narrow interpretation that remote sensing shall only be conducted for limited civilian purposes and no military applications for remote sensing shall be allowed.

A better understanding is provided under Principle IV which states that activities are to be undertaken keeping in mind the rights and interests of the sensed country and in accordance with international law. Principle XII further directs the sensing country to provide access to all primary data and the processed data to the sensed country on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms. However, there is a continuous debate regarding the ambiguous nature in which the words ‘non-discriminatory’ and ‘on a reasonable basis’ have been used in the provisions.

The Principles on Remote Sensing also obligate states to undertake remote sensing activities in consonance with norms of international law and state responsibility, therefore the Principles on Remote Sensing act as the basis for states to be held accountable for their actions and also creates obligations for them under the international law framework. On the other hand, the recent rise of non-state actors who have increasingly begun to be drawn into the space race means that Principles in their current form are not extended to them. Further, the rapid ascension of private entities into the commercial satellite spaces also creates a new challenge for the existing framework which is not only not designed to encompass such non-state actors but also does not take into consideration their involvement in military conflicts. The lacunae in this regard needs to be addressed keeping in mind the changing dynamics, especially in light of recent developments.

Conclusion

Lawful remote sensing should be a matter of consent and consultation. Any military espionage using commercial assets with respect to remote sensing should not be considered lawful as it infringes the rights and interests of the sensed countries. It is surprising that most countries do not consider remote sensing by other countries for military purposes to be unlawful. The majority of countries which possess capabilities to use remote sensing technologies for espionage and reconnaissance are the ones with vast wealth and tremendous military capabilities, this may be one of the reasons why unlawful remote sensing is still ubiquitous in the present day. A combined reading of Article I, III and IV of the Outer Space Treaty tells us that the Outer Space Treaty only creates a loose obligation on all State parties who are to conduct activities for the benefit and interest of all countries, which shall be done in accordance with the international law in the interest of maintaining international peace and promoting international cooperation and that it shall be done exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Principles IV and XII of the Remote Sensing Principles 1986, are small steps toward the right direction as they make it mandatory for countries to have the prior consent of the sensed country before undertaking any remote sensing activities and provide all the primary data concerning the sensed country in a non-discriminatory and cost-effective manner.


*4th year BA., LLB(H) student at National Law University and Judicial Academy Assam

**Associate Professor of Law, National Law University and Judicial Academy Assam

Can Space Tourism co-exist with Space being turned into a War Zone?

Karl Grossman*

Keywords:   Outer Space Treaty – PAROS Treaty – Peaceful purpose – Space Doves – Space Force

The push to turn space into a war zone could spell goodbye to space tourism.

The space tourism drive that is underway, led by billionaires Jeff Bezos, Richard Branson and Elon Musk is seen as only a start. Meanwhile, there’s the push, led by the United States, to turn space into a war zone—and this, despite the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 that sets space aside for peaceful purposes. As the then U.S. President Donald Trump declared in 2018 while advocating for formation of a U.S. Space Force, “it is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.”The following year, he signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020 establishing the Space Force as the sixth branch of U.S. armed forces and said: “Space is the world’s newest war fighting domain.” The Space Force, Trump said, would “help” the U.S. “control the ultimate high ground.”  Then, at the unveiling of a Space Force flag at the White House, Trump said: “Space is going to be…the future, both in terms of defense and offense.”

Trump’s successor, U.S. President Joe Biden, has not rolled back the U.S. Space Force. Several Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives last year introduced the No Militarization of Space Act that would abolish the U.S. Space Force. The prime author of the legislation, Representative Jared Huffman of California, in a statement, called the Space Force “costly and unnecessary.” 

The measure got nowhere. That was not surprising considering that most Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate and nearly all the members of the Republican Party voted for the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020 providing for the Space Force’s formation. Thus, the U.S. Space Force is moving forward.

Last year, Space Force requested a budget of $17.4 billion for 2022 to expand its reach as reported by Air Force Magazine.  Space Force also aims to fund more than $800 million in new classified programs.“Guardians” is the name adopted by the U.S. Space Force in 2021 for its members.

In 2020, the Space Force received its first offensive weapon: satellite jammers. The satellite jammers can be used to interrupt any satellite communication and can hinder warning systems designed to detect attacks from the US. Soon afterwards, the Financial Times’ headline was: “U.S military officials eye new generation of space weapons.”

As to the impacts of war in space, Bruce Gagnon, coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, in an interview in 2021 said:

In 1989 during one of our campaigns against NASA plutonium launches [NASA’s launching of plutonium-powered space probes], we had a rally at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, and our keynote speaker that day was Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell, one of the moonwalkers. And he came and said if there is one war in space, it’ll be the one and the only. He said because we will create so much space debris or space junk from all the destroyed satellites and things like that in space that there would literally be a minefield encircling the planet – he called it a piranha-laced river—and we would not be able to get through. A rocket would not be able to get off this Earth through that minefield. So, it’s insane to think about having a war in space.

Gagnon has also spoke of how space warfare would mean activity on Earth would immediately shut down as cell phones, ATM machines, cable TV, traffic lights, weather prediction and more are all hooked up to satellites.

Alexander Chanock, while pointing to the generation of space debris resulting from warfare in space, noted that space weapons would produce an immense amount of space debris. Chanock, then a candidate for a law degree, now a legislative counsel in the US House of Representatives, wrote that, “The Fear is that destroying in space could generate extremely dangerous debris with a long orbital life.”

Chanock quoted Dr. Joel Primack, professor of physics and astrophysics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, stating that “the weaponization of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes.”

The blueprint for international cooperation in space has been the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which sets aside space for peaceful purposes and declares it a “global commons.” It was put together by the United States, United Kingdom and the former Soviet Union and has wide support from nations around the world. As Craig Eisendrath, who as a young U.S. State Department office was involved in the treaty’s creation, explained, the aim of the Outer Space Treaty was to de-weaponise space before it got weaponized to keep war out of space altogether.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits placement “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies.”  For decades there has been an effort to extend the Outer Space Treaty and enact the Prevention of an Arms Race (PAROS) treaty, which would bar the placement of any weapons in space. China, Russia and Canada have been leaders in seeking passage of the PAROS treaty. But the United States—through administration after administration, Republican and Democrat—has opposed the PAROS treaty and effectively vetoed it at the United Nations. A rationale for the U.S. Space Force has been that it is necessary to counter moves by Russia and China in space, particularly development of anti-satellite weapons. This is what a Cable News Network report in 2021, titled “An Exclusive Look into How Space Force is Defending America,” centrally asserted. There was no mention in the six-minute-plus CNN piece of how China and Russia have been leaders for decades in the push for PAROS, and how China and Russia in recent times have reiterated their calls for space to be weapons-free.

Most recently, the U.S. concern about Russia and China moving into space militarily was heightened by Russia in November 2021 using an anti-satellite weapon to blow up a defunct Soviet intelligence satellite that was launched in 1992. Dr. Paul Robinson, professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa, in an article on RT, views that the Russian effort may be intended to bring the United States to the negotiating table by highlighting the space vulnerability.

The history of U.S. interest in space warfare includes the Strategic Defense Initiative scheme of the U.S. President Ronald Reagan during 1980s, dubbed “Star Wars,” predicated on orbiting battle platforms with on-board hypervelocity guns, particle beams and laser weapons energized by also on-board nuclear reactors.

A U.S. Space Command was set up in 1985. The motto of one of its units, the 50th Space Wing is “Master of Space”. The unit is now a component of the U.S. Space Force.

A January 2022 article in Air Force Magazine called attention on this aggressive stance of the U.S. Space Force. Alexander Chanock also expressed concerns on this issue in his article published in the Journal of Air Law and Commerce. While highlighting the contrasting views on the U.S. developing space weapons, he refers to “Space Doves”, who are against space weaponization, especially Nina Tannenwald. Tannenwald wrote that in the long run she believes that the best way to protect American interests in space would be through stability of the rule of law, rather than through unilateral assertions of military power. She asserts that US should promote a transition to a regime that consists of mutual restraint and benefit in space.

However, Chanock, in his piece, stated: “Although space doves have many valid arguments for reducing the danger of space weaponization, in reality, it is unlikely that their ideas will prevail.” He noted: “The U.S. Congress has consistently rejected any bill that tries to ban the use of space weapons.” He cited bills that “sought to ban space weapons but failed” including the one introduced in 2001 by Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio which “did not garner a single co-sponsor.”

Internationally, since the creation of the U.S. Space Force, several nations—including the United Kingdom—have begun to emulate the U.S. in space military posture. “How to halt the space arms race” was the headline of an article in the British publication The New Statesman in 2021. It stated: “This year the UK launched its own space command, with military chiefs acknowledging space as a domain of conflict co-equal with air, land, sea and cyber,” said the piece by Paul Mason.

“We are stuck,” the article concluded. “And while polite verbal fencing takes place at the UN, the major powers of the 21st century are engaged in an unprecedented expansion of military power in space, leaving the vast majority of countries powerless, most of humanity as passive spectators, and the Earth’s orbit increasingly polluted with debris from exploded satellites.”

This is pessimistic forecast need not be. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was—and is—a visionary documentary. War on Earth is terrible enough. It must not be brought up to the heavens. This will take continued political will and international pressure—to preserve and extend the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and its setting aside space for peaceful purposes. Especially in the United States, this will require action at the grassroots because the two major political parties in the U.S. have joined in a bellicose stance on space, supporting it becoming a war zone. Every year, the grassroots organization Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, founded in Washington, D.C. in 1992 and the leading group internationally challenging the weaponization of space, holds a “Keep Space For Peace Week” with actions around the world. Meanwhile, there are nations around the globe that have, unlike the U.S., adopted a peaceful stance—as reflected in their support for the proposed PAROS treaty.

We must, indeed, keep space for peace. Can space tourism co-exist with space being turned into a war zone? The answer is no. And with a shooting war in space, it will not only space tourism that would be kissed goodbye.


*Professor of Journalism at the State University of New York/College at Old Westbury & Co-founder of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space.

Responsibility for Activities in Outer Space

Danny Johansen*

Keywords: Article VI – Outer Space Treaty – Private Entities – State Responsibility –Ultra Vires

Outer space has always fascinated humanity, which continues to be so in the current day. Private entities are looking to outer space as never before with tourism flights(1), space resources extraction,(2) and even space beer.(3) As most of these activities are done in the interest of the private entities instead of the international community as a whole, debate on private activities in space has attained significance. Is space tourism just rich people playing around and destroying the environment?(4) Whether resource extraction on the moon is in conflict with the Outer Space Treaty?(5) These are just a few of the questions that have arisen in this context.

No matter what side one is on in this relevant debate, a fundamental and older question is; to what degree a state is responsible for the acts of private entities?

Outer Space Treaty

Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty(6) by the first look answers this question when it states that, state parties shall bear international responsibility for national activities, no matter whether it is being done by a state organ or by a private entity. It also points out that the state must authorize and supervise the activities of private players.

Article VI is quite a deviation from the normal customary rules of international law for state responsibility, which is found crystallized in the Articles on State Responsibility(7). Under the rules of the Articles on State Responsibility a state will be responsible for internationally wrongful acts if a conduct consists of an action or omission that is both attributable to the state, and is in conflict with an international obligation of the state.(8) If the act is conducted by a private entity, certain criteria must be fulfilled for the act to be attributable to the state.(9) The criteria vary but there must be some sort of connection between the state and the wrongful act of the private entity like the state authorizing or instructing a private entity to do such an act or the state acknowledging such an act as its own.

Attributability in the Articles on State Responsibility operates as a lower limit for fixing responsibility on any state. Private entities engaging in theft, murder or other offenses would face individual responsibility and state wouldn’t be responsible unless the action can be said to be under the authorization or instruction from the state (and thus attributable). When Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty attributes every activity in outer space to the state, the question would arise on the responsibility of states under the Outer Space Treaty for every tort or a crime committed by the private space entities.

Responsible for what?

Some scholars have pointed out that it can be claimed that the duty of the state can be confined to authorization and supervision.(10) Other scholars are arguing that Article VI attributes all actions, and thus responsibility for every action of a private entity is on the state.(11)

While discussing authorization for the actions by the private players, it has been argued that there has to be a lower limit so that an astronaut needing to brush his teeth does not require to ask the national authorization agency for permission.(12) The same can be said for what actions can be attributed to the state. Bin Cheng discussed that the responsibility could have a wide and a narrow interpretation. The narrow interpretation being that the state is responsible for its normal obligations under international law and would also be responsible for actions by private entities as if they were made by a state agency. The wide interpretation would be that the state is responsible for all actions of private entities.(13)

However, even the narrow interpretation of Bin Cheng still offers a broad range of activities that the state may be responsible for. Thus, a heavy burden of responsibility is imposed on the state, which seems to be undesirable. Also the requisite clarity on the authorization and responsibility of the state for private actions is found missing in these arguments.

Article VI does specifically mention that the actions must be in conformity with the Outer Space Treaty, and thus, it does seem obvious that at least any action in conflict with the Treaty would call upon responsibility. A follow-up question could then be: Is the state responsibility limited to authorization and supervision of private entities or does it stretch beyond to cover the breach committed by private entities? This matters in the situation where a state implements laws regulating private entities in outer space, and only authorizes activity in space in conformity with the Outer Space Treaty. If the private entity then goes against the authorization and commits a breach of the Outer Space Treaty, concerns would arise in fixing responsibility as it is unclear whether the state is directly responsible for the breach or for not preventing the breach by the private entity.

Article VI is famously a compromise between the ideology of the USA and the Soviet Union, where one party wanted free access to space for private entities, and the other wanted to only allow the states to carryon activities in outer space.(14) So it is probably safe to say that the intention was to ensure that the states took the activities of private entities in outer space serious, and that they therefore were directly responsible for the action. However, under the changed circumstances arising out of the increased private space activities, it stands as a problematic proposition.

Application of Public International Law

Article III of the Outer Space Treaty states that all space activities must be in conformity with the public international law. Many states have applied this in their authorization process stating that the activity must not conflict with their international obligations.(15)  Sensible as it may be that international law applies to space; however, this is where we find the aggravation of the problem. Many criminal activities performed by private entities may fall within the ambit of breach of international law upon attribution to the state.

Many different situations could arise. Would every possible murder on the moon be classified as a state assassination? Would theft in a space hotel be attributed to the state? If this would be the primary interpretation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, most states would probably halt private entities from going into outer space. Such a harsh interpretation would confine the humanity to Earth, which is unwise from any perspective.

Solution?

What then would be the minimum threshold for attributing private activities to the state? The Draft Articles on State Responsibility does contain the concept of “Ultra Vires”.(16) When a state agent or organ exceeds authority, the state shall still be held responsible for the actions, if the agent acts in the capacity it has been appointed. So, if an agent has been empowered to exercise governmental authority, the state has responsibility, unless it is clearly outside the function the agent is entrusted. This is of course not directly applicable to the situation at hand as we are dealing with private entities. The essence of the principle could however be used. When an authorized private entity performs activities in outer space, it can be said to wield some kind of state authority, and all of its actions under authorization can be attributed to the state.

It could then be said that if the private entity acts outside the scope of the authorization it should be examined if the entity at least still acted within the capacity of the authorization. This should at least sort out many of the actions done entirely in a private capacity, like for example, murder, theft, extortion etc. Whereas the actions in violation of essential principles of the space treaties, for example, an action contrary to the non-appropriation principle, using nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, contaminating the outer space and celestial bodies and such, would trust responsibility upon the state. Thus, the use of the principle of Ultra Vires would ensure a much needed balance in the application of responsibility norms for private space activities.

References:

* Ph.D. Fellow, Legal Institute, University of Southern Denmark.

(1) Space.com, ‘Space Tourism’ available at
<https://www.space.com/topics/space-tourism> last visited 28 November 2021.

(2) Mike Wall, ‘Trump signs executive order to support moon mining, tap asteroid resources’, available at
<https://www.space.com/trump-moon-mining-space-resources-executive-order.html> last visited 28 November 2021.

(3) Hanneke Weitering, ‘Space beer, anyone? Hops flying on SpaceX’s private astronaut mission Inspiration4 will be auctioned for charity’, available at
<https://www.space.com/inspiration4-space-beer-hops-auction> last visited 28 November 2021.

(4) Tereza Pultarova, ‘The rise of space tourism could affect Earth’s climate in unforeseen ways, scientists worry’, available at
<
https://www.space.com/environmental-impact-space-tourism-flights> last visited 28 November 2021.

(5) Brooks Hays, ‘New U.S. space mining law may violate international treaty’, available at
<https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2015/11/27/New-US-space-mining-law-may-violate-international-treaty/8751448634436/> last visited 28 November 2021.

(6) The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

(7) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR), 2001.

(8)ASR, Art. 1

(9) ASR, Art. 8 – 11

(10) The Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, ‘Outer Space, Liability for Damage’, Pedrazzi, Marco, 2008, Para 2.

(11) For example, Ibid, Francis Lyall & Paul B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (Burlington: Ashgate Pub. Limited, 2009) p. 60.

(12) Testimony of Laura Montgomery Ground Based Space Matters Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Space, Science and Competitiveness, Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty Will Impact American Commerce and Settlement in Space. May 23, 2017, Russell Senate Office Building. p. 5.

(13) Bin Cheng, Studies in international space law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) pp. 633 & 634.

(14) Frans G. Von der Dunk, National Space Legislation in Europe: Issues of Authorisation of Private Space Activities in the Light of Developments in European Space Cooperation (Netherlands: Brill, 2011) p. 3.

(15) Stephan Hobe et al., Cologne Commentary on Space Law – Outer Space Treaty: КёльнскийКомментарийККосмическомуПраву – ДоговорПоКосмосу (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2017) p. 417.

(16) ASR Art. 7.