Challenges of Space Security Governance

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan*

Keywords:  ASAT test – Geopolitics – Nuclear weapons – Outer Space Treaty (OST) – WMD

Outer space has become one of the most contested global commons today. Outer space has always been affected by great power politics but the intensity of that competition has increased in the last two decades. This is particularly evident in space security developments and in the global governance arena. With the growing geopolitical flux, space security is gaining more salience. On the global governance front, lack of consensus among the major space powers has become the most serious impediment in developing an effective outer space regime.

Increasing Salience of Space Security

A particular salience of space security is that more and more countries are pursuing their space programmes with a security agenda as a key driver. Countries that had pursued a purely civilian space programme with an almost complete focus on peaceful applications of space are reviewing and re-directing their space programmes to assume a greater role for security purposes. Many countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond have gone on to establish dedicated military space institutions and/or are developing defence space strategies that are in tune with the growing space security threats. These are clear indicators of the securitization of space. There are of course many factors such as the US-China space competition, growth of counter-space capabilities and the growing profile of private sector that have pushed these changing space security dynamics. All of this is a result of the changing geopolitical churning that is underway in the Indo-Pacific, which has emphasized a great deal on hard power including in outer space. Securitization of political and sovereignty-related territorial issues has meant that states tend to accumulate military advantage in every domain. Given that space has become so integral to conventional military operations, gaining an edge in the military space domain including through acquisition of counter-space capabilities has become more or less the norm.

To give one instance, take the case of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. After conducting multiple ASAT tests in the 1980s, both the US and the USSR had put an end to ASAT tests, acknowledging their harmful impact for the long-term sustainability of space. However, China kick-started ASAT testing, breaking a moratorium that prevailed for more than two decades, in January 2007. This gave way to more countries undertaking ASAT tests and several more have begun investing in the technology. Following the Chinese ASAT test, the US conducted its own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost) in January 2008 and India demonstrated its capability in March 2019. These are merely demonstrative of the fact that space security dynamics are changing and giving way to a more competitive environment.

An inescapable fact is that China’s test has had spin off effects with other countries conducting ASAT tests or are in pursuit of such weapons. India offers the best example in this regard. India was one of the most vocal critics of the US and the Soviet military space programmes and their ASAT tests in the 1980s and New Delhi had a steadfast civilian space programme but was compelled to rethink its space orientation following the Chinese ASAT test. The 2007 test set off a new debate within the country on how it should respond to the Chinese ASAT weapon and the implications of the China’s new weapon. Similar debates have been taking place in other countries as well including Japan, which has already invested in interceptor technology.

While ASATs are particularly destructive and considered as inherently destabilizing, there are a range of other counter-space capabilities including cyber and electronic warfare in space that are becoming a more attractive option for states should they want to interfere with or destroy other states’ satellites. Cyber and electronic warfare means have been used in many instances for more than a decade.

There are also other challenges such as emerging new actors as well as non-state players, space debris, crowded orbits triggering radio frequency interferences, issues of spectrum allocation, and problems of access to space, especially for new and emerging players. All of these make space crowded and congested, and access to space more difficult and dangerous. For many developing countries that have just begun to appreciate the use of space in changing the lives of people, getting access to space technology and expertise is still challenging, a reason why they emphasize technology sharing in the context of global governance.

Most of these problems are new. The difference comes from the fact that states have demonstrated greater inclination to develop and use offensive counter-space capabilities intended at creating temporary disruptions in other countries’ satellite operations. This trend is far more visible today than what was witnessed during the Cold War. There have been growing instances wherein cyber and electronic warfare means have been used resulting in temporary disruptions. While no ASAT weapon has yet been used to target space assets, possibly because of immediate and serious consequences, lack of response to instances of cyber and electronic warfare is normalizing bad or irresponsible behaviour. Irrespective of the damage, whether it is temporary or permanent, there must be repercussions. Absence of repercussions could encourage perpetrators to carry on with such attacks. This highlights again the need for identifying clear lines or red lines, beyond which there must be consequences. The red lines must also be disseminated in the public so that the adversaries are also clear that there is a red line they should not cross. In the absence of such articulations, what is increasingly seen is that norms that have prevailed for long are being challenged and/or are broken. The norm to not test ASAT has been broken since January 2007 when China broke a decade-long norm. Similarly, growing instances of the use of other counter-space weapons creating temporary disruptions are also violation of existing norms to not interfere in each other’s satellite operations. Unless these actions are curbed, the danger of normalizing such bad behaviour will be a bigger challenge to address at a later date.

Along with capability developments, countries are also responding in terms of new dedicated military space institutional mechanisms for better civil-military interface as well as to formulate longer term strategies and policy approaches. India went about establishing a Defence Space Agency (DSA) in October 2019 to ensure better coordination between the Department of Space, the Indian military and the Ministry of Defence. Countries such as Australia, Japan, and France have their own debates about how to further integrate space with their military. Meanwhile, other countries who already have such institutions include Russia (Russian Aerospace Defence Forces, 2011), China (People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, 2015), and the US (Space Force, 2019).

Global Governance in a Limbo

The growing space security developments point to the urgent need for new rules of the road. But global governance discussions in the last decade or so have been quite turbulent with some of the recent efforts such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGEs) not even able to produce consensus reports at the end of their deliberations. This is reflective of the fractured nature of the global politics and the great power rivalries that have become antagonistic to the point of not even being able to agree on an outcome document. The inability of all the major space powers to come together to agree on important space security challenges and possible solutions have thwarted solutions.

Outer space is not bereft of any treaties and governing measures, but these came about in a different era when the threats were of a significantly different nature. The primary concerns during the 1960s and 1970s were about nuclear weapons unlike today where non-nuclear and conventional weapons have come to occupy the center-stage. Therefore, the existing legal measures, including the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, are proving to be ineffective in tacking contemporary threats. The OST remains the fundamental treaty measure in ensuring the sanctity of outer space, but it has an important lacuna – the treaty only prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and says nothing about non-WMD weapons. Also, there are a number of new activities being undertaken and new technologies being developed, which are not considered in the OST. Activities, including on-orbit satellite servicing that essentially extends the life of a satellites by remotely repairing or refuelling satellites or technologies such as those to remove space debris, are relatively new and we need new rules to frame the parameters to undertake such activities and moderate the use of these new technologies. While these are defensive and peaceful activities, given the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, such activities are watched with a lot of concern. Finally, there are a broader set of new actors in space including industry players whose roles and responsibilities need to be clear, which help or hinder the process of rule-making. Given the growing presence of industry players in space, there have been efforts to give them a voice at the global governance debates, but this has been challenging.

Whatever form and shape new rules take, the need to identify basic tenets of responsible behaviour cannot be ignored. Given the growth in the number and types of actors, we need new norms and rules that will define and identify clear limits of responsible behaviour in space. One can explore the possibilities of reviewing the existing rules and regulations, but given the fractured nature of global politics, the feasibility of developing a common understanding in how some of the existing measures can be revised will be a non-starter. But it is clear that given the significance of outer space in our daily lives, any disruption will have a far-reaching impact in terms of multiple sectors being affected but also different regions. There are additional complications like how an over-crowded outer space can cause radio-frequency disturbances but because of the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, even a natural event or a mechanical failure could be considered by some state as an intentional attack. This kind of a scenario highlights the urgent need for crisis communications and standard operating procedures to confirm if something was a natural event or an attack.

While there have been several efforts in recent years to formulate new rules and regulations governing outer space activities, none of these have reached any fruitful conclusion. These include the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 2010, the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs), the 2018-19 as well as 2023 UN GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and the 2022-23 Open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours. It is not the lack of understanding of the threats and challenges among the major space powers that there is no progress but there are a couple of other factors that have come to affect today’s state of limbo.

For one, there are philosophical differences in how different countries approach space security challenges and possible solutions. A group of mostly Western countries with the US in the lead believe that political measures including norms of responsible behaviour such as Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) are effective measures under current international political climate when trust and confidence among states are at an all-time low. Given the fractured natured of international politics, the US and a group of countries have felt that developing legal measures may not be a feasible way for the immediate future. A second group of countries led by China and Russia have in the meantime insisted on legal measures as the only effective means to address space security challenges. This assumes that legal measures are like magic bullets and once states sign onto treaties and agreements, all the space security challenges will be dealt with. This is far from the truth as history demonstrates, especially in the Asian context. Finding a compromise between these schools of thought has not been easy.

Two, rule-making exercise has been far more difficult in recent years because unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, when two or three powers worked out what is best and everyone else fell in line, today there are more than eight major space actors and they all want to have a say in how the new rules are written. Developing a consensus in a group of nearly 100 space players is an extraordinary task. Further, the changing balance of power dynamics is unlikely to settle down in the near future, which also means the inflexible stances that major powers have taken so far will continue to hold for a reasonable period of time, making governance debates extremely challenging. Instead, what might be required and feasible is to go for smaller technical agreements that would address various challenges individually than attempt to develop a large comprehensive treaty that might not take off in the near future.


*Author is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Recent Efforts on Developing New Norms for Space Security: A Brief Overview 

Kiran Mohan Vazhapully* 

Key Words: Conference on Disarmament – EU CoC – PPWT – Space security – Space weapons 

On 13 May 2022, the first formal meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on reducing space threats (OEWG), established by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) based on a proposal by the United Kingdom, concluded in Geneva. The Working Group inter alia aims “to make recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours relating to threats by States to space systems, including, as appropriate, how they would contribute to the negotiation of legally binding instruments, including on the prevention of an arms race in outer space”. Importantly, this meeting opened the issue to most States that have not been active in previous space disarmament deliberations.  

Reportedly, the meeting was collegial despite the long-held differences among major space-faring nations on the form and content of the future norms. This is a welcome departure from the past negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in this regard— marred by stark differences of opinions and inflexible positions. When viewed alongside the United States’ recent, self-imposed ban on anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests and Canada matching this pledge, this constructive development augurs well for space security and sustainability and has the potential to fill in the gaps in existing international law. Significantly, Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, by prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, provides only for partial demilitarisation of outer space. This provision does not cover ASAT weapons and dual-use, co-orbital technologies— both weapons of choice in space for a few nations in the 21st century. 

Differences Persist 

However, as is clear from their submissions to the OEWG, China and Russia continue to promote their idea of a legally binding treaty in intergovernmental fora. In 2008, they jointly submitted to the CD the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT/Draft Treaty) aimed at preventing an arms race in space.  The signatories to the treaty would commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” The PPWT also stipulates that the parties may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the Treaty. 

Noticeably, the Draft Treaty omitted ground-based ASAT weapons from its purview, which the United States vehemently criticised. The Draft Treaty was also opposed for its absence of a verification mechanism to ensure compliance. Further, the PPWT also does not ban the development, testing, or stockpiling of weapons on the ground that could be promptly placed on orbit. Instead, it calls for “transparency and confidence-building measures” implemented on a “voluntary basis.” An updated version of the Draft Treaty was submitted in 2014, but these issues stayed on. Consequently, the proposal could not receive sufficient support in the CD. 

European Efforts 

Contrastingly, western nations advocate for “soft law”, initially in the form of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) for arms control in outer space. Officially released in 2008, the European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (CoC) was envisioned as TCBMs that would strengthen existing regulations. This initiative did not favour the developing States, notably BRICS, as they were excluded from the process. It was perceived as an exclusive EU project.  

The sponsors of CoC tried to address this concern in 2014 through a more inclusive approach—by engaging in a broader consultation process and renaming the amended draft “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities”. Even after three rounds of consultations, disagreements on the form and content of the new norms persisted. China and Russia wanted a binding agreement and had already proposed PPWT. Further, there were differences of opinion on the choice of forum for negotiation and process among EU member states and others. The EU member states advocated for an ad hoc process to ensure broader participation, while a few other States argued for an UN-based approach. These differences, along with confusion about the methodology and the way forward, ultimately led to the failure of this initiative. 

Space Security at the UN 

Aside from these State-led initiatives, the UNGA took the lead in establishing a Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space Activities in 2011. As the discussions at the CD had been in limbo for several years, many States saw the UNGGE as a way forward on space security matters. The UNGGE convened in 2012 and 2013 and submitted its final report in 2013. The report outlined conclusions and recommendations on TCBMs to ensure strategic stability in outer space. Its recommendations inter alia included information sharing on national policies and activities in outer space, notifications of risk reduction efforts, and voluntary visits to launch sites. However, implementation of these recommendations has been minimal, and thus, has had limited impact on norm creation on space security. 

Following informal discussions on the practical implementation of these TCBMs in 2017, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a part of the UNGA, explored ways in which the recommendations of the 2013 UNGGE report could be implemented. However, the progress in this direction has been negligible as the UNDC couldn’t even convene the meetings to carry forward this task.  

Another GGE was convened in 2018 and 2019 to identify issues and options to advance a legally binding instrument. Again, due to lack of consensus on a final report of recommendations, no legally binding instrument emerged out of it. Nevertheless, the work carried out by the Group did highlight points of convergence in several areas, such as the applicability of international law— particularly the applicability of the UN Charter to outer space activities, the freedom of access to outer space without discrimination and on the basis of equality, and the need to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States. 

Concluding Thoughts 

As mentioned earlier, the UNGA set up the OWEG primarily on the efforts of the United Kingdom. The UK initiated this latest exercise on law-making for space security by sponsoring UNGA Res.75/36 on “reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” in 2020. The resolution prudently chose to stay clear of recommending neither a binding treaty nor “soft law” as the product of these deliberations, thereby opening a new pathway for future engagements in this regard. Herein, the focus was on what constitutes threatening and destabilising space behaviour rather than the nature or type of space weapons. This move was followed up by the UK co-sponsored resolution in 2021 to establish the OWEG, which received wide-ranging support in the UNGA. The OEWG, in its next meeting in September 2022, will focus on current and future threats to space systems. 

It appears that international efforts on space demilitarisation have received a new lifeline. The momentum created by the most recent endeavours gives another opportunity for States to reconcile their differences and disagreements on this critical issue. It is hoped that proactive discussions at the OWEG will contribute positively to reducing threats to civilian activities in outer space, making it less congested, contested, and competitive.  

* Kiran Mohan Vazhapully is Senior Legal Officer at the Secretariat of Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), an intergovernmental organization based in New Delhi. Views are personal. 

References 

PPWT, submitted by China and the Russian Federation, https://www. reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/cd/2008/documents/Draft%20PPWT.pdf 

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities – Version 31 March 2014, Draft, available online at https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/disarmament-non-proliferation-and-arms-export-control/14715 

Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess. U.N. Doc A/68/189* (29 July 2013), available online at  

https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/oosadoc/data/documents/2013/a/a68189_0.html

Michael Listner and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “The 2014 PPWT: A New Draft but With the Same and Different Problems,” The Space Review, August 11, 2014, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2575/1 

UN General Assembly, “Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities: Note by the Secretary-General,” A/68/189, July 29, 2013 

2018 UN Disarmament Commission Working Group II, Secretariat nonpaper, n.d., https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/WG2-secretariat-non-paper-outer-space-TCBMs-FINAL.pdf 

UN General Assembly, “Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” A/RES/72/250, January 12, 2018 

“UK Push for Landmark UN Resolution to Agree Responsible Behaviour in Space,” UK Foreign Office, August 26, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-push-for-landmark-un-resolution-to-agree-responsible-behaviour-in-space