Time for an Indian National Space Security Policy?

Adithya Variath*

Keywords:  ASAT – Indian Space Policy – National Security – Open-ended Working Group – Space Security – USSF

Introduction

On 24 April 2024, Russia vetoed a resolution at the United Nations Security Council calling on all countries to prevent an arms race in outer space. The resolution was drafted by the United States and Japan as a response to reports that Russia was developing a nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Military use has been a key feature of space activities since the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as the event fuelled both the space race and the arms race. States continue to deal with a wide range of conventional and non-conventional security challenges in outer space. Today outer space is becoming a highly contested zone. Space-based defence has become essential to protect valuable space assets from a pre-emptive attack. However, the larger threat is the growing fear of space weapons used in space warfare.

The Outer Space Treaty and UN Efforts

There is also a growing demand for reading the future of ASAT in light of Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter and the customary international law principles of necessity and proportionality. The Outer Space Treaty drafted by the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) was hailed as a significant landmark in man’s effort to control the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to prevent military confrontations on celestial bodies. Article IV of the OST prohibits the State parties from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The most controversial debate about the OST has been over the interpretation of the words “peaceful purposes”. Some argue that any military use of satellites is “non-peaceful” while others argue that only “aggressive” use of satellites is non-peaceful. Many states believe that as long as it is not aggressive, any military activity is “use of space for peaceful purposes.”

In 2022, during a joint ad hoc meeting of the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) and Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), the UN expressed concerns about the growing weaponisation in outer space and called for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. The recent Russian veto with one abstention by China in the Security Council rejected the draft resolution which called upon active contribution by all States to ensure peaceful use of outer space and to prevent arms race in outer space. Responsibility of States with major space capabilities is stressed upon under the draft resolution. The need for refraining from actions contrary to UN treaties was also mentioned in the wake of maintaining international peace and security as well as promoting international cooperation.

Russia’s UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenziain said that “the resolution is absolutely absurd and politicized”, “a cynical ploy with hidden motives” and he added, “it didn’t go far enough in banning all types of weapons in space.” There is no doubt that the adoption of this resolution would have promoted international efforts towards the peaceful use and exploration of outer space. However, geopolitics around the future of weaponisation calls for a critical analysis. In December 2019, NATO leaders recognizing the role of space in enhancing defence and national security declared space a fifth operational domain, alongside air, land, maritime and cyberspace. While NATO has maintained that it would not ‘weaponise’ space by developing offensive capabilities, the NATO declaration recognized “its importance in keeping us safe and tackling security challenges, while upholding international law”. Several superpowers have already institutionalised the militarization of space.

Space Forces, and the Working Group to Reduce Space Threats

Established in 1992, the Russian Space Forces became the first independent space force in the world. In 2019, the United States created the Space Force and Space Command, a specialized branch for pursuing superiority in the space domain. The United States Space Force’s (USSF) doctrine states that “in keeping with international law, the United States acknowledges that the use of space is for peaceful purposes.” USSF doctrine guides the proper use of military space power and establishes a common framework for strategy development. In December 2023, NASA announced Space Security: Best Practices Guide in order “to bolster mission cybersecurity efforts for both public sector and private sector space activities.” The United Kingdom’s National Space Security Policy states that “it should be read in conjunction with the Civil Space Strategy and it sets out UK space security needs and interests across Government and the need for close co-operation with our international partners, research organisations and industry.”

The debate on space security received global momentum with the 2023 Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours. It was convened under General Assembly Resolution 76/231 on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. The Working Group was entrusted with the responsibility of making recommendations on responsible behaviours relating to threats by States to space systems, including on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The report never saw consensus. The fate of the report reflects the bullish behaviour of states and their reluctance to any form of self-regulation. While it was a new chance for the global actors to build a common understanding, the failure of consensus also reflects that growing space-faring nations like India will need to address their own space security concerns by evolving holistic space security policies.

Indian Developments

India is also actively pushing its space technology towards the direction of becoming a space military power. On 27 March 2019, India successfully conducted an ASAT test in its operation code-named Mission Shakti. India joined China, Russia, and the United States which have such capabilities. In 2010, India established the Integrated Space Cell to enhance coordination between the Department of Space and the Indian Armed Forces. In 2018, India set up the Defence Space Agency.

India has not formulated its national space law, however, in 2023, India unveiled its Indian Space Policy (ISP). While scholars have argued that the policy has several inherent defects and inconsistencies, it can be seen as the first step by the state to leverage commercial space capabilities and maximize the potential of the multi-billion-dollar space economy. The 2023 ISP has used the word “national security” only two times. While a civilian space agency-formulated commercial policy need not mention these aspects, space-based intelligence, lunar and cislunar activities, space situational awareness and military communication in positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities need to be formulated in a national security structure in the coming times.

While the demand for national space legislation continues to exist, the next step in line should be developing a space defence strategy and a national space security policy. The fundamental aspect of the policy should be to set up institutional structures that can enhance space situational awareness and counter-space capabilities and to develop guidelines against hostile space activities. It also becomes critical, especially considering India’s neighbourhood tensions and the nuclear security trilemma between India, Pakistan and China. Considering the geopolitical and astropolitical tensions in the South Asian region, China’s growing space power and space diplomacy have security implications for India. China has expanded the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to outer space through the ‘Space Information Corridor’ or ‘Space Silk Road’, to provide a variety of satellite-based services to its BRI partners. China has developed a well-structured diversification of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In April 2024, the PLA reorganized its national security architecture. The PLA now consists of four services, namely, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, and four arms, namely, the Aerospace, Cyberspace, Information Support, and Joint Logistic Support Forces. The head of the United States Space Command warned of China’s space programs “breathtakingly fast”, it is a cause of concern for its immediate neighbours.

India has also used space as an integral part of its regional policy, for example, the launch of the ‘South Asia Satellite’ (GSAT-9) in May 2017 was welcomed by fellow SAARC members, except Pakistan. While space-based technology is used for socio-economic development, India’s emergence as a regional power to mitigate China’s growing interest and power in the Indian Ocean region also lies in the integration of military security with space exploration. India is also expanding its transnational cooperation in strengthening its space diplomacy and space security partnerships with Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, France and others.

Concluding Remarks

Space technology is enhancing India’s capability to address both civil and military aspects of space security, security preparedness and military operations. Space assets are also vulnerable to a growing number of orbital, kinetic and electronic warfare and this adds a cybersecurity element to space technologies. India needs a National Space Security Policy, which will focus on embracing technological opportunities and making space-based capabilities more resilient to the risks of operating in space. In the United States, the USSF gets support from commercial partnerships to enhance capabilities in space launch and space sustainment. A national space security policy will also provide infrastructure and logistics support to coordinate military activities with the civil and commercial space programs.

A national space security policy can also help DefSpace start-ups in indigenisation, which can enhance the combat capabilities of the armed forces. A framework for forging space partnerships, building space technology clusters and sustaining terrestrial and on-orbit space systems is the need of the hour considering India’s geopolitical tensions. With the growth of new technologies and emerging players, a national security policy will not only help India build responsible space behaviour architecture but also strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific.


* The author is an Assistant Professor of Law and Coordinator, Centre for Research in Air and Space Laws at Maharashtra National Law University Mumbai.

Challenges of Space Security Governance

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan*

Keywords:  ASAT test – Geopolitics – Nuclear weapons – Outer Space Treaty (OST) – WMD

Outer space has become one of the most contested global commons today. Outer space has always been affected by great power politics but the intensity of that competition has increased in the last two decades. This is particularly evident in space security developments and in the global governance arena. With the growing geopolitical flux, space security is gaining more salience. On the global governance front, lack of consensus among the major space powers has become the most serious impediment in developing an effective outer space regime.

Increasing Salience of Space Security

A particular salience of space security is that more and more countries are pursuing their space programmes with a security agenda as a key driver. Countries that had pursued a purely civilian space programme with an almost complete focus on peaceful applications of space are reviewing and re-directing their space programmes to assume a greater role for security purposes. Many countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond have gone on to establish dedicated military space institutions and/or are developing defence space strategies that are in tune with the growing space security threats. These are clear indicators of the securitization of space. There are of course many factors such as the US-China space competition, growth of counter-space capabilities and the growing profile of private sector that have pushed these changing space security dynamics. All of this is a result of the changing geopolitical churning that is underway in the Indo-Pacific, which has emphasized a great deal on hard power including in outer space. Securitization of political and sovereignty-related territorial issues has meant that states tend to accumulate military advantage in every domain. Given that space has become so integral to conventional military operations, gaining an edge in the military space domain including through acquisition of counter-space capabilities has become more or less the norm.

To give one instance, take the case of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. After conducting multiple ASAT tests in the 1980s, both the US and the USSR had put an end to ASAT tests, acknowledging their harmful impact for the long-term sustainability of space. However, China kick-started ASAT testing, breaking a moratorium that prevailed for more than two decades, in January 2007. This gave way to more countries undertaking ASAT tests and several more have begun investing in the technology. Following the Chinese ASAT test, the US conducted its own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost) in January 2008 and India demonstrated its capability in March 2019. These are merely demonstrative of the fact that space security dynamics are changing and giving way to a more competitive environment.

An inescapable fact is that China’s test has had spin off effects with other countries conducting ASAT tests or are in pursuit of such weapons. India offers the best example in this regard. India was one of the most vocal critics of the US and the Soviet military space programmes and their ASAT tests in the 1980s and New Delhi had a steadfast civilian space programme but was compelled to rethink its space orientation following the Chinese ASAT test. The 2007 test set off a new debate within the country on how it should respond to the Chinese ASAT weapon and the implications of the China’s new weapon. Similar debates have been taking place in other countries as well including Japan, which has already invested in interceptor technology.

While ASATs are particularly destructive and considered as inherently destabilizing, there are a range of other counter-space capabilities including cyber and electronic warfare in space that are becoming a more attractive option for states should they want to interfere with or destroy other states’ satellites. Cyber and electronic warfare means have been used in many instances for more than a decade.

There are also other challenges such as emerging new actors as well as non-state players, space debris, crowded orbits triggering radio frequency interferences, issues of spectrum allocation, and problems of access to space, especially for new and emerging players. All of these make space crowded and congested, and access to space more difficult and dangerous. For many developing countries that have just begun to appreciate the use of space in changing the lives of people, getting access to space technology and expertise is still challenging, a reason why they emphasize technology sharing in the context of global governance.

Most of these problems are new. The difference comes from the fact that states have demonstrated greater inclination to develop and use offensive counter-space capabilities intended at creating temporary disruptions in other countries’ satellite operations. This trend is far more visible today than what was witnessed during the Cold War. There have been growing instances wherein cyber and electronic warfare means have been used resulting in temporary disruptions. While no ASAT weapon has yet been used to target space assets, possibly because of immediate and serious consequences, lack of response to instances of cyber and electronic warfare is normalizing bad or irresponsible behaviour. Irrespective of the damage, whether it is temporary or permanent, there must be repercussions. Absence of repercussions could encourage perpetrators to carry on with such attacks. This highlights again the need for identifying clear lines or red lines, beyond which there must be consequences. The red lines must also be disseminated in the public so that the adversaries are also clear that there is a red line they should not cross. In the absence of such articulations, what is increasingly seen is that norms that have prevailed for long are being challenged and/or are broken. The norm to not test ASAT has been broken since January 2007 when China broke a decade-long norm. Similarly, growing instances of the use of other counter-space weapons creating temporary disruptions are also violation of existing norms to not interfere in each other’s satellite operations. Unless these actions are curbed, the danger of normalizing such bad behaviour will be a bigger challenge to address at a later date.

Along with capability developments, countries are also responding in terms of new dedicated military space institutional mechanisms for better civil-military interface as well as to formulate longer term strategies and policy approaches. India went about establishing a Defence Space Agency (DSA) in October 2019 to ensure better coordination between the Department of Space, the Indian military and the Ministry of Defence. Countries such as Australia, Japan, and France have their own debates about how to further integrate space with their military. Meanwhile, other countries who already have such institutions include Russia (Russian Aerospace Defence Forces, 2011), China (People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, 2015), and the US (Space Force, 2019).

Global Governance in a Limbo

The growing space security developments point to the urgent need for new rules of the road. But global governance discussions in the last decade or so have been quite turbulent with some of the recent efforts such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGEs) not even able to produce consensus reports at the end of their deliberations. This is reflective of the fractured nature of the global politics and the great power rivalries that have become antagonistic to the point of not even being able to agree on an outcome document. The inability of all the major space powers to come together to agree on important space security challenges and possible solutions have thwarted solutions.

Outer space is not bereft of any treaties and governing measures, but these came about in a different era when the threats were of a significantly different nature. The primary concerns during the 1960s and 1970s were about nuclear weapons unlike today where non-nuclear and conventional weapons have come to occupy the center-stage. Therefore, the existing legal measures, including the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, are proving to be ineffective in tacking contemporary threats. The OST remains the fundamental treaty measure in ensuring the sanctity of outer space, but it has an important lacuna – the treaty only prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and says nothing about non-WMD weapons. Also, there are a number of new activities being undertaken and new technologies being developed, which are not considered in the OST. Activities, including on-orbit satellite servicing that essentially extends the life of a satellites by remotely repairing or refuelling satellites or technologies such as those to remove space debris, are relatively new and we need new rules to frame the parameters to undertake such activities and moderate the use of these new technologies. While these are defensive and peaceful activities, given the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, such activities are watched with a lot of concern. Finally, there are a broader set of new actors in space including industry players whose roles and responsibilities need to be clear, which help or hinder the process of rule-making. Given the growing presence of industry players in space, there have been efforts to give them a voice at the global governance debates, but this has been challenging.

Whatever form and shape new rules take, the need to identify basic tenets of responsible behaviour cannot be ignored. Given the growth in the number and types of actors, we need new norms and rules that will define and identify clear limits of responsible behaviour in space. One can explore the possibilities of reviewing the existing rules and regulations, but given the fractured nature of global politics, the feasibility of developing a common understanding in how some of the existing measures can be revised will be a non-starter. But it is clear that given the significance of outer space in our daily lives, any disruption will have a far-reaching impact in terms of multiple sectors being affected but also different regions. There are additional complications like how an over-crowded outer space can cause radio-frequency disturbances but because of the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, even a natural event or a mechanical failure could be considered by some state as an intentional attack. This kind of a scenario highlights the urgent need for crisis communications and standard operating procedures to confirm if something was a natural event or an attack.

While there have been several efforts in recent years to formulate new rules and regulations governing outer space activities, none of these have reached any fruitful conclusion. These include the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 2010, the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs), the 2018-19 as well as 2023 UN GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and the 2022-23 Open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours. It is not the lack of understanding of the threats and challenges among the major space powers that there is no progress but there are a couple of other factors that have come to affect today’s state of limbo.

For one, there are philosophical differences in how different countries approach space security challenges and possible solutions. A group of mostly Western countries with the US in the lead believe that political measures including norms of responsible behaviour such as Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) are effective measures under current international political climate when trust and confidence among states are at an all-time low. Given the fractured natured of international politics, the US and a group of countries have felt that developing legal measures may not be a feasible way for the immediate future. A second group of countries led by China and Russia have in the meantime insisted on legal measures as the only effective means to address space security challenges. This assumes that legal measures are like magic bullets and once states sign onto treaties and agreements, all the space security challenges will be dealt with. This is far from the truth as history demonstrates, especially in the Asian context. Finding a compromise between these schools of thought has not been easy.

Two, rule-making exercise has been far more difficult in recent years because unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, when two or three powers worked out what is best and everyone else fell in line, today there are more than eight major space actors and they all want to have a say in how the new rules are written. Developing a consensus in a group of nearly 100 space players is an extraordinary task. Further, the changing balance of power dynamics is unlikely to settle down in the near future, which also means the inflexible stances that major powers have taken so far will continue to hold for a reasonable period of time, making governance debates extremely challenging. Instead, what might be required and feasible is to go for smaller technical agreements that would address various challenges individually than attempt to develop a large comprehensive treaty that might not take off in the near future.


*Author is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.