Cislunar Space Strategy in Light of the Outer Space Treaty

Thomas Paul Kanatt*

Keywords:   Appropriation – DARPA – Human presence – Militarize – Outer Space Treaty

The Artemis Accords, which got publicized in 2020, marked a new phase in the United States space policy with the mission of sending crewed missions to the Moon and beyond. Whilst many debates had arisen regarding this Program, the United States was looking for the next big thing in space to assert its supremacy and leadership in space. In pursuance of this, the government released a “National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy,” (NCST) in November 2022, which consists of a document that would guide the actions of the US Government in advancing science, exploration and economic development activities in the Cislunar space.

This blog seeks to critically examine this strategy in light of the internationally accepted Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies commonly called as the Outer Space Treaty

Essence of the NCST

Cislunar space is the space beyond Earth’s geosynchronous orbit which is under the gravitation influence of both the Earth and the Moon. This includes the Lagrange points, the trajectories utilizing these regions and the Lunar surface.  

The Cislunar space is of critical importance for developing space infrastructure, space resource mining, lunar exploration and more importantly for establishing a domain for national security. It also offers an opportunity to enable crewed exploration to Mars and beyond. In fact, the U.S. Government estimates that the level of human activity in Cislunar space over the next decade could exceed everything that has happened there between 1957 and today, combined. The ultimate aim of these objectives is to achieve development in Cislunar Space with the leadership of U.S. playing a central role.  

With this strategy in mind, the document devises 4 main objectives in the early years of Cislunar growth:

  1. Support research and development to enable long term growth in Cislunar space. 
  2. Expand international science and technology cooperation in Cislunar space.
  3. Extend U.S. space situational awareness capabilities into Cislunar space. 
  4. Implement Cislunar communications, positioning, navigation and timing capabilities with scalable and interoperable approaches.

Intent to Militarize

As part of their aim to enable an enduring human presence in Cislunar space and resource utilization in Moon, the US is looking to develop capabilities like manufacturing of components from in-situ materials, autonomous assembly of structures in space and construction of structures that maximize the use of in-situ materials. On the same note, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) had released the Novel Orbital Moon Manufacturing, Materials, and Mass Efficient Design (NOM4D) program, which seeks to establish off-earth manufacturing by producing structures in outer space. Therefore, in essence, the NOM4D Program by DARPA fulfils the first objective of the Cislunar space objectives of supporting emerging technologies to enable long term growth in Cislunar space.

However, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty advocates for using the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. It also prohibits the establishment of any military bases, installations and fortifications on celestial bodies. DARPA is an agency of the US Department of Defense for the development of technologies to be used by military forces to enhance national security. Therefore, any endeavor by this agency will only be viewed by other countries as a statement of intent to militarize the moon, thereby, violating Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. This makes the NOM4D program inconsistent with the country’s commitments under the Treaty.

Claims of Appropriation 

As part of the US Government’s plan to enable long term growth in Cislunar space, the US Government intends to partner up with private entities, many of whom in this regard have already published their objectives for operating in Cislunar Space. The provisions of the NCST endorse the government to build sustainable habitats on planetary surfaces to support an enduring human presence. In pursuit of this, private companies like United Launch Alliance have already laid out their vision for Cislunar Space development, which focuses on constructing human habitats not just for scientific research but also for tourism objectives.

However, the US Government’s plans of operating in the Cislunar space traverse the scope of the basic intent of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits any claim of appropriation. In this context, the word appropriation relates to a taking which involves more than a temporary or casual occupation of land. The intent of the US Government in partnering with private entities to build a permanent settlement on a planetary body for its own use constitutes a claim of appropriation, thereby violating Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 

Benefit and Interest of all Countries

The exploits of the US government additionally violate Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which mandates the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. Article I also guarantees free access to all areas of celestial bodies to all States. By appropriating property for itself and by building long term habitats, the US is effectively excluding access for other countries over those areas. This further bolsters the argument of appropriation against the United States in violation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.

As asserted by Rene Mankiewicz, anything taken from the Moon has to be used for the benefit and interest of the whole of mankind and not just that of a single nation. Objective 1 of NCST facilitates the development of lunar surface technologies and resource assessment technologies to enable an enduring human presence on the Moon. However, there has been no mention of sharing the benefits with other nations through such activities. Even though an argument could be made that Objective 2 of the NCST assuages this concern by facilitating engagement with other countries, a careful reading of the document suggests otherwise. Objective 2 specifically mentions pursuing engagement with other nations only in certain areas of science and technology like debris mitigation, collision avoidance and flight safety. Moreover, past practice shows that ownership would eventually be asserted over resources that are extracted by the United States from the Moon. Such individual claims of ownership do not satisfy the requirements under Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty in terms of carrying on exploration of the Moon for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, thereby violating the Treaty.

Underlying Scheme

The basic purpose behind the NCST is projected as the advancement of science and exploration in the Cislunar area, however a deeper reading of the objectives would reveal otherwise. Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty only sanctions exploration and use of lunar resources for scientific investigation; however, the present objectives of the NCST go far beyond the use for scientific purposes, and extend to exploitation of the resources for long term habitation and other operations on the Moon. As part of this strategy, the US government envisions other private entities operating in the Cislunar Space and as a part of its longer term goal, it foresees a ‘Cislunar Ecosystem’. This ‘Cislunar ecosystem’ involves utilization of reserves on the moon as resources for extraction and for supporting other activities that are of a permanent nature on the moon.

The above discussion indicates that the underlying scheme of the NCST does not respect the essence of both Article I and II of the Outer Space Treaty. Since the aim would eventually be to enable a long term human presence, supported by the utilization of resources on the moon and construction of permanent structures and habitats, the respect for benefits and interest principles and non-appropriation principle is difficult to prove.

Concluding Remarks

Cislunar space offers a lot of opportunity and potential for future growth; however, any activity pursued there must be carefully monitored to be in compliance with treaty obligations of States. The NCST poses serious questions on the compliance of the United States’ obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. Hence, the objectives should be streamlined and amended to ensure that the partnership with private entities does not result in contravention of international legal obligations.

* Pursuing BA/LLB (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur.

References:

  1. Virgiliu Pop, ‘Appropriation in outer space: The relationship between land ownership and sovereignty on the celestial bodies’, Space Policy, Vol. 16, Issue 4, 2000, pp. 275 – 282.
  2. Mankiewicz R., ‘Interventions with respect to permanent stations on the Moon’, Proceedings of the Eleventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1968, p. 163.
  3. Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, S’pace Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive’, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 73, Issue 1, 2008, pp. 37 – 78.
  4. Marc-Andre Chavy-Macdonald, et al., ‘The cis-lunar ecosystem — A systems model and scenarios of the resource industry and its impact’, Acta Astronautica, Vol. 188, 2021, pp. 545 – 558.

Military Use of Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites

Agniva Das* and Dr. Amol Deo Chavhan**

Keywords: Commercial Satellites – Militarisation – Remote Sensing – Satellite Imagery – Outer Space Treaty

Background

On 1 March 2022, Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov sent out an appeal to most of the world’s commercial satellite companies via Twitter urging them to help Ukraine by providing satellite imagery for military purposes. The Minister urged eight of the world’s leading earth observation satellite companies to provide high-resolution satellite imagery to monitor Russian troop advancements. Companies like Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs have openly published the images to the media, which is how the world has been witnessing the menace and destruction caused by the war in real time. Moreover, on 2 March 2022, Elon Musk in a tweet acknowledged his direct support to Ukraine by promising to provide better internet connectivity by activating the internet terminals of his satellite internet constellation – Starlink. When civilian or commercial satellites are used for military purposes, it raises serious concerns regarding whether the satellites are to be considered as civilian or military assets.

This is not the first time that civilian or commercial satellites have been used during a military conflict for military purposes. Operation Enduring Freedom, alternatively known as the Global War on Terror, was the first instance when the military relied heavily on commercial satellite space assets like high resolution satellite imagery and satellite communications.

Remote sensing has been used as a mode of surveillance for centuries. Even before the First World War, remote sensors have been utilised by attaching them to hot air balloons and flying them over target cities.  Now, however, specialised satellites with variegated capabilities are being used for remote sensing. These include but are not limited to optical satellites, radar imaging satellites, ultraviolet and infrared imagery satellites, and signal intercepting communication satellites. Remote sensing has several advantages over any other forms of reconnaissance as it can provide high-resolution imagery of not only visible light but also other wavelengths of light. This information can be further used for monitoring enemy troop advancements, strategic planning, and tactical threat assessment.

With the explosive growth of science and technology and the reliance of military activities on the same, the demand for better connectivity and higher-resolution imagery was beyond the military’s ability to fulfil with military owned satellite technologies. The biggest military in the world, the United States Military has since then heavily relied on commercial satellite assets for military use.

Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States have dedicated billions of dollars for the renovation of their military satellite technology for the swift utilisation of these assets by the UK, US and Canadian forces in the ‘Global War on Terror’. Infact, in the year 2006 the United States National Space Policy which was authorised by then President George W. Bush directed all governmental departments and agencies to use, purchase and even modify the U.S. commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum extent to meet the United States Government requirements and make them cost-effective.

Legalities

Such instances have raised further questions regarding the legalities of the militarisation of commercial or civilian satellites, especially with respect to remote sensing, which has been widely debated in recent years. 

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Outer Space Treaty, provides certain general provisions for the peaceful exploration and use of space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law. However, it does not provide any specific provision to tackle the legal problems surrounding remote sensing.

It is certainly difficult to understand what kind of military applications fall under activities that are “for the benefit and interest of all countries” as mentioned in the Outer Space Treaty, as any military activity by one country can be seen as an act of aggression by another country. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, thus, creates a loose obligation that all activities should not be ‘harmful’ in the general sense as opposed to being ‘beneficial’. However, it does not provide any clarity on whether placing commercial remote sensing assets with military capabilities in earth orbit is in the common interest of all countries.

Article III of the Outer Space Treaty dictates that all outer space activities shall be conducted in accordance with international law which shall include the Charter of the United Nations and it shall be in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding. Since the United Nations Charter overrides rights or obligations under any other treaty, the Outer Space Treaty must be read in consonance with the United Nations Charter. In the interest of maintaining international cooperation, Article 2(4)  of the United Nations Charter provides that countries should refrain from threatening and using force against the territorial integrity of any country, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing into orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and seeks the complete demilitarisation of celestial bodies. However, when read in unison with the United Nations Charter, it can be understood that no restrictions are imposed on any other military activities like remote sensing or satellite communications.

Article IV further dictates that the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used for ‘peaceful uses’ by all State parties. Fortification, setting up military establishments and testing of weapons are strictly forbidden. What the Outer Space Treaty fails to address is the clear meaning of ‘peaceful uses’ and what kinds of activities fall under this definition. Moreover, the provision provides for peaceful use of the Moon and other celestial bodies but fails to mention that outer space as a whole is ought to be used for peaceful purposes and not only for celestial bodies.

The question that arises here is whether using military capabilities like remote sensing of other countries by using commercial assets violates or infringes the rights or territorial integrity of those countries. If we were to consider the principles of air and maritime law, it is clear that reconnaissance or espionage is permissible on the high seas but not in the territorial waters or the territorial airspace of countries targeted for surveillance.

The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (the “Remote Sensing Principles”) which was adopted by the United Nations in 1986 creates more confusion in this regard as Principle I of the same states that “remote sensing activities by countries shall be conducted to improve natural resources management, land use and the protection of the environment.” This provision leaves room for narrow interpretation that remote sensing shall only be conducted for limited civilian purposes and no military applications for remote sensing shall be allowed.

A better understanding is provided under Principle IV which states that activities are to be undertaken keeping in mind the rights and interests of the sensed country and in accordance with international law. Principle XII further directs the sensing country to provide access to all primary data and the processed data to the sensed country on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms. However, there is a continuous debate regarding the ambiguous nature in which the words ‘non-discriminatory’ and ‘on a reasonable basis’ have been used in the provisions.

The Principles on Remote Sensing also obligate states to undertake remote sensing activities in consonance with norms of international law and state responsibility, therefore the Principles on Remote Sensing act as the basis for states to be held accountable for their actions and also creates obligations for them under the international law framework. On the other hand, the recent rise of non-state actors who have increasingly begun to be drawn into the space race means that Principles in their current form are not extended to them. Further, the rapid ascension of private entities into the commercial satellite spaces also creates a new challenge for the existing framework which is not only not designed to encompass such non-state actors but also does not take into consideration their involvement in military conflicts. The lacunae in this regard needs to be addressed keeping in mind the changing dynamics, especially in light of recent developments.

Conclusion

Lawful remote sensing should be a matter of consent and consultation. Any military espionage using commercial assets with respect to remote sensing should not be considered lawful as it infringes the rights and interests of the sensed countries. It is surprising that most countries do not consider remote sensing by other countries for military purposes to be unlawful. The majority of countries which possess capabilities to use remote sensing technologies for espionage and reconnaissance are the ones with vast wealth and tremendous military capabilities, this may be one of the reasons why unlawful remote sensing is still ubiquitous in the present day. A combined reading of Article I, III and IV of the Outer Space Treaty tells us that the Outer Space Treaty only creates a loose obligation on all State parties who are to conduct activities for the benefit and interest of all countries, which shall be done in accordance with the international law in the interest of maintaining international peace and promoting international cooperation and that it shall be done exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Principles IV and XII of the Remote Sensing Principles 1986, are small steps toward the right direction as they make it mandatory for countries to have the prior consent of the sensed country before undertaking any remote sensing activities and provide all the primary data concerning the sensed country in a non-discriminatory and cost-effective manner.


*4th year BA., LLB(H) student at National Law University and Judicial Academy Assam

**Associate Professor of Law, National Law University and Judicial Academy Assam