Go First Insolvency: Exploiting the Lacuna in the Aircraft Rules 1937

Karan Nimish Vakil*

Key Words: Aircraft Repossession – Bankruptcy Code – Cape Town Convention – DGCA – IDERA

The outlook for commercial aviation in India had been buzzing with optimism. After the mismanagement and irregularities that ultimately led to the ongoing insolvency of Jet Airways, Air India’s much publicized mammoth order of 840 aircraft (comprising of 470 firm orders and 370 options and purchase rights, split between manufacturing giants Boeing and Airbus) had given legitimate cause for a shift in the mood of the commercial aviation sector in India. Adding to this were press reports claiming a similar sized order from Indigo being negotiated, along with a three-digit order from nascent entrant Akasa Air.

However, ever since the admission of Go Airlines (India) Ltd.’s (“Go First”) recent petition seeking voluntary initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), New Delhi, [now also upheld by an order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), New Delhi] it is safe to say that the momentum that the sector was experiencing has not only been halted but reversed. Stakeholders across the sector have been left embittered, and none more than Go First’s aircraft lessors.

A common misconception among those outside the aviation sector is that commercial airlines own all of the aircraft that they operate. Rather, the fleet of most commercial airlines consists of a blend (in varying ratios) of owned and leased aircraft. The essence of aircraft leasing is not dissimilar from the leasing of other capital-intensive assets insomuch that it simply involves the leasing of an asset (in this case, aircraft) by a lessor to a lessee for a fixed and limited duration of time in exchange for periodical rental payments. Go First has a fleet of 59 aircraft, the majority of which are leased rather than owned. 

The relevant pieces of international law that govern the facilitating of efficient leasing of aircraft arethe Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (“the Cape Town Convention”) and the Protocol to the Convention on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (“the Cape Town Protocol”). The Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol were created with the intention of inter aliareducing creditor risk, doing so by providing speedy remedies for repossession of aircraft by aircraft lessors from aircraft lessees that may be exercised upon the occurrence of certain trigger events as may be set out in the aircraft lease agreement, such as insolvency of the aircraft lessee. Specifically, this is done by providing for a mechanism by which aircraft lessors can repossess the aircraft unilaterally, through a primary document called an Irrevocable Deregistration and Export Request Authorisation (IDERA); the relevant provision that empowers aircraft lessors with this mechanism is Article XIII of the Cape Town Protocol. This, among other provisions of the Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol all have the effect of reducing lessor risk, which in turn reduces the cost of aircraft leasing in the form of lower premiums on lease rentals. It then reduces the lessee’s cost of operation, ultimately resulting in a trickle-down effect on ticket prices, benefiting the consumer. 

Despite having acceded to the Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol in 2008, India is yet to formally adopt this international treaty into its domestic law framework. Given that India follows a policy of dualism with regard to its obligations under international law, the Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol are not recognised by Indian Courts as binding domestic law. It is pertinent to note here that the Lok Sabha even introduced the Cape Town Convention Bill, 2018 (“the 2018 Bill”) to implement the Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol as domestic law, but this has since seen minimal progress towards being passed as a central act. As a result, aircraft lessors leasing aircraft into India are unable to exercise the various provisions of the Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol that exist for the protection of their interests. Instead, aircraft lessors are forced to rely on domestic laws such as the Aircraft Rules, 1937 (“the Rules”). Amendments in 2016 incorporated (albeit to a limited extent) the abovementioned Article XIII of the Cape Town Protocol into the newly created Rule 30(7) of the Rules. However, these amendments have been proved to be largely ineffective in helping to alleviate the high level of risk involved in the leasing of capital-intensive aircraft.

Shortly after the Rules were amended as explained above, the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the IBC”) was enacted. This latter piece of legislation came with a non-obstante clause, embodied in its Section 238, which has had the effect of negating the pro-lessor provisions of the Rules. This will be pragmatically explained using Go First’s abovementioned recent voluntary initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process. 

The regulatory body in India that is empowered to act on an IDERA and facilitate the repossession of an aircraft from an aircraft lessee to an aircraft lessor is the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), which is under the control of the Ministry of Civil Aviation (Government of India). While Rule 30(7) of the Rules calls upon the DGCA to cancel the registration of an aircraft (thereby beginning the process of repossession of the aircraft) within 5 working days of receipt of an application in the prescribed form from the IDERA holder (aircraft lessor), this stipulated time limit is empirically not considered to commence from the date of actual receipt of such application, but from the time of affirmation by the DGCA of such application being in order (at which point the DGCA publishes the same on its website). In the case of Go First’s petition for voluntary initiation of the CIRP, the NCLT, acting on its 14-day time limit as stipulated in Section 10(4) of the IBC, admitted the same in just 8 days (the petition was filed on 2 May 2023 and admitted on 10 May 2023), before which the DGCA (taking advantage of the flexible time limit) failed to cancel the registration of any of Go First’s leased aircraft despite the fact that several such applications were published by the DGCA on its website prior to admission of the petition(in some cases, even more than 5 days before admission of the petition). Upon admission of the petition, moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC was triggered, inter alia prohibiting “the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied or in the possession of the corporate debtor”, that is, Go First. It is noteworthy here that in the only other example of insolvency proceedings qua an Indian airline (the ongoing insolvency of Jet Airways), the period of moratorium, which commenced on 20 June 2019, has well exceeded the stipulated period of 330 days under Section 12 of the IBC. To this day, such moratorium continues, seeming indefinite. Consequently, aircraft lessors are left with their recourse for repossession of aircraft under the rules being completely negated by virtue of the IBC. 

Go First’s Chief Executive Officer, Kaushik Khona, has openly stated to the press that “the airline filing an insolvency petition with the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) is not a ruse to get loan write offs but mainly to safeguard/ retain the aircrafts so that the lessors do not repose them”, this quote even being reproduced in paragraph 29 of the abovementioned NCLAT order. Clearly, Go First has found a way to weaponize the IBC, using it as a tool to hold on to leased aircraft that do not belong to them. This has left aircraft lessors with an extremely sceptical outlook towards future aircraft leasing into India. This impression has already been reflected in India’s Cape Town Convention Compliance Index score, which is an internationally recognized rating on a scale of 100 that monitors and assesses compliance by contracting states to the Cape Town Convention and the Cape Town Protocol.

The Government of India has exposed itself to heavy criticism from the global aviation community for its laissez-faire attitude towards Go First’s ongoing corporate insolvency resolution process. Not only has the Government of India failed to adequately respond to the situation, but it has also failed to conclusively pre-empt it. It is crucial to note here that the Lok Sabha even went as far as introducing the Protection and Enforcement of Interests in Aircraft Objects Bill, 2022 (“the 2022 Bill”), Section 19 of which actually takes cognisance of the possibility of aircraft lessees weaponizing the IBC to hold on to leased aircraft. Accordingly, the said Section 19 of the Bill carves out an exemption from Section 14 of the IBC for leased aircraft, allowing for leased aircraft to be repossessed by the aircraft lessor (creditor) within no later than 2 calendar months of the commencement of insolvency proceedings against the aircraft lessee (corporate debtor), subject to certain conditions being met. However, this too, like the 2018 Bill, has seen minimal progress towards being passed as a central law. With the proposed expansions of Air India, Indigo and Akasa Air, it is imperative for the Government of India to step in and restore lessor confidence in the commercial aviation sector of India either by giving teeth to the Rules and ensuring that it overrides the provisions of the IBC, or by expediting the enactment of the 2018 Bill and the 2022 Bill so as to disarm aircraft lessees from taking undue advantage of this substantial lacuna in the law.


* The Author is an Associate at Tyabji Dayabhai, Advocates & Solicitors.

Devas-Antrix Deal: When will the Ghosts of Fraud be Exorcised from the Aviation Sector?

Soumya Gupta* and Dr. Shouvik Kumar Guha**

Keywords: Devas-Antrix Deal – Arbitral Award – Corporate Fraud – Insolvency – Air India.

History of the Dispute

Given the increasing reliance of India on space-based assets and technology, especially for the communications sector, the Devas-Antrix dispute that seems like an ever-renewing source of controversies involving the misuse of political power and governance norms for profit-based ulterior motives, represents a black mark in the country’s aviation and space law spheres. The beginning of the Devas-Antrix debacle goes back to 2005 when an agreement was entered into by Antrix Corporation [‘Antrix’] and Devas Multimedia Private Limited [‘Devas’]. Antrix, established in 1992, was created to commercialize space products. Devas, short for Digitally Enhanced Video Audio Services, set up by former Indian Space Research Organization [‘ISRO’] engineers, and was developed for betterment of satellite communications in space. Devas also has foreign investors from Mauritius involved in the building of the company. The agreed terms were that Antrix will provide 70 MHz of the S-Band space segment to Devas for its digital multimedia services. The S-band space segment is generally used by security forces and government telecom entities and is scarce is global marketplace. Accordingly, Antrix would build, launch and operate two satellites GSAT-6 and GSAT-6A, and lease 90% of the satellite transponder capacity to Devas for its digital multimedia services. Devas agreed to pay a total of $300 million over twelve years to Antrix. Thus, the overall aim of the signed project was to provide broadband wireless services to the remote areas of India.

With a rather achievable and needful goal, both parties proceeded towards their respective duties. However, six years into operation, certain irregularities were noticed and highlighted by mainstream media like The Hindu – these included discrepancies such as financial mismanagement, conflict of interest, non-compliance of rules, and favoritism. Subsequently, February, 2011 witnessed the cancellation of the deal by the then Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, based on the ambiguously worded phrase security reasons Soon after that, allegations surfaced that the Antrix contract deal was tainted with corruption, which was not an out-of-the-box allegation against the United Progressive Alliance government. The decision to annul the deal was taken amidst the 2G scam and in the face of mounting claims that the deal involved the handing over of communication spectrum valued at nearly Rs 2 lakh crore for a mere pittance.

Chain of Arbitral Awards and Judicial Decisions

The uncalled and invalid abrogation of the deal had upset Devas, which led to a series of judicial decisions. The three legal disputes that arose from this were a commercial arbitration between the Antrix and Devas Multimedia at the International Chambers of Commerce [‘ICC’], and two bilateral investment treaty [‘BIT’] arbitrations brought by the Mauritius investors in Devas Multimedia under the India-Mauritius BIT [‘Devas tribunal’] and by German company Deutsche Telekom under the India Germany BIT [‘DT tribunal’]. India saw victory in none of the three international disputes. The ICC arbitration tribunal in 2015 ordered Antrix to pay $562.5 million-plus interest to Devas as damages for wrongfully repudiating the contract. A United States [‘US’] court recognized and confirmed the ICC award in 2021. India appealed against the decision of the Devas and DT tribunals before the Dutch and Swiss courts respectively but lost again. Thus, all the international proceedings had issued orders against India; however, in India there were a variety of other issues raised against Devas.

Cases and Investigations were filed against both the parties in India as well. The Department of Space [‘DoS’] said that the Central Bureau of Investigation has filed an FIR against Devas and other unknown public servants of Antrix/ISRO/DoS and it is presently under investigation. The Enforcement Directorate has launched an investigation against Devas and its directors and foreign subsidiaries under Prevention of Money Laundering Act and Foreign Exchange Management Act [‘FEMA’]. Devas Multimedia is suspected to have received foreign direct investment of Rs. 578.54 crore between May 2006 and June 2010 from various overseas investors, but the share subscription agreements it entered with them contained clauses contrary to the conditions specified in the approvals granted by Foreign Investment Promotion Board. Devas Multimedia was also charged with contravening the FDI regulations under FEMA for assuring foreign investors an annual eight per cent priority dividend in addition to other dividends on cumulative basis, and for one tranche of receipt of funds, issuing a security akin to an External Commercial Borrowing promising higher returns than the ceiling fixed by the Reserve Bank of India.

In October 2020, a US court asked Antrix to pay the damages after Devas investors approached it for enforcement of the award. The Canadian Court in this regard allowed Devas’ shareholders to seize an amount of over USD 30 million of the Airport Authority of India [‘AAI’] held by the International Air Transport Association [‘IATA’]. This US court order was put on stay by the Indian Supreme Court in November 2020. The Court also asked the Delhi High Court to hear arguments from Antrix against the enforcement of the award. Later, in January 2021, acting upon the advice of Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Antrix approached the Bangalore bench of the National Company Law Tribunal [‘NCLT’] in January 2021, to initiate a winding up petition against Devas under Companies Act. NCLT passed a judgment to wind up Devas on account of fraud during the original deal. Among the other contentions brought forth by Antrix, a key one was that its original agreement with Devas mentioned subsidiaries and associate entities like the DEVAS2 Technology, DEVAS Device and DEVAS Services, despite none of these entities ever being in existence throughout the existence of the original company. In September 2021, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [‘NCLAT’] upheld the NCLT judgment. Subsequently, one of the ex-directors of Devas Multimedia and DEMPL, a minority shareholder in Devas, challenged the NCLAT order before the Supreme Court. The latest development in the series of judgments and orders happened on January 17, 2022, where the Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT judgment on winding up Devas, and also the NCLAT finding that the entire company had been set up with fraudulent motives in connivance with certain officials from Antrix. In doing so, the Supreme Court also refused to entertain Devas’ argument that the current petition filed by Antrix had been done solely to deprive Devas of the benefits of the aforementioned international arbitral awards, or that Antrix’s petition is barred by limitation.

What Lies Ahead?

The trajectory of international judicial decisions show that Devas is armed with orders against India and has initiated proceedings in multiple jurisdictions to attach the assets of Indian public sector undertakings. Devas has witnessed success in courts of France and Canada. The Indian government is resolute to get Devas to wound up; however, it is not easy to get an irrevocable criminal conviction in this case. The Supreme Court judgment is helpful in challenging the attachment order on the basis that Devas-Antix contract violates international public policy since the contract was contaminated with fraud from the beginning. Generally, courts accord high deference to an arbitral award and refrain from delving into the merits of the case. Added to the fact is that India has already lost two cases emerging from violation of the BITs. This would mean that India will have to put up a tough fight in international courts. The end of the Devas-Antrix saga anytime soon seems bleak since both the parties are trying to make their best case using all legal aid available.

In response to the asset seizing order favoring Devas, the AAI in the beginning of the year announced that it would defend itself by taking legal recourse. These assets include, inter alia, air navigation charges and aerodrome charges collected on behalf of AAI. A huge battle lies ahead of AAI to defend its assets from getting attached. Earlier, Indian government did not choose the best legal way to defend itself in the tribunals. However, considering the huge amount at risk here, it is essential that AAI takes a sound legal step ahead, keeping in mind the consequences that could follow for an already pandemic-hit aviation industry. The initial developments so far seem promising, with the erstwhile Indian national carrier Air India already having won a judgment in its favour in February 2022 from the Quebec High Court in Canada, allowing it to challenge an earlier Canadian order to consider the airline as a representative of the Indian government and seize its funds to give effect to recovery of compensation, as awarded under earlier arbitral awards, by foreign shareholders of Devas. A similar challenge is also on its way at the United States Federal Court for the Southern District of New York. Meanwhile, with the shareholding of Air India having been transferred to the Tata Group of companies through the latter’s subsidiary Telace, arguments claiming the carrier as an alternative to the Indian government for recovery of said arbitral awards, are likely to face even greater opposition before any court of law.



* Student, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences

** Assistant Professor of Law (Senior Scale), The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences