Challenges of Space Security Governance

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan*

Keywords:  ASAT test – Geopolitics – Nuclear weapons – Outer Space Treaty (OST) – WMD

Outer space has become one of the most contested global commons today. Outer space has always been affected by great power politics but the intensity of that competition has increased in the last two decades. This is particularly evident in space security developments and in the global governance arena. With the growing geopolitical flux, space security is gaining more salience. On the global governance front, lack of consensus among the major space powers has become the most serious impediment in developing an effective outer space regime.

Increasing Salience of Space Security

A particular salience of space security is that more and more countries are pursuing their space programmes with a security agenda as a key driver. Countries that had pursued a purely civilian space programme with an almost complete focus on peaceful applications of space are reviewing and re-directing their space programmes to assume a greater role for security purposes. Many countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond have gone on to establish dedicated military space institutions and/or are developing defence space strategies that are in tune with the growing space security threats. These are clear indicators of the securitization of space. There are of course many factors such as the US-China space competition, growth of counter-space capabilities and the growing profile of private sector that have pushed these changing space security dynamics. All of this is a result of the changing geopolitical churning that is underway in the Indo-Pacific, which has emphasized a great deal on hard power including in outer space. Securitization of political and sovereignty-related territorial issues has meant that states tend to accumulate military advantage in every domain. Given that space has become so integral to conventional military operations, gaining an edge in the military space domain including through acquisition of counter-space capabilities has become more or less the norm.

To give one instance, take the case of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. After conducting multiple ASAT tests in the 1980s, both the US and the USSR had put an end to ASAT tests, acknowledging their harmful impact for the long-term sustainability of space. However, China kick-started ASAT testing, breaking a moratorium that prevailed for more than two decades, in January 2007. This gave way to more countries undertaking ASAT tests and several more have begun investing in the technology. Following the Chinese ASAT test, the US conducted its own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost) in January 2008 and India demonstrated its capability in March 2019. These are merely demonstrative of the fact that space security dynamics are changing and giving way to a more competitive environment.

An inescapable fact is that China’s test has had spin off effects with other countries conducting ASAT tests or are in pursuit of such weapons. India offers the best example in this regard. India was one of the most vocal critics of the US and the Soviet military space programmes and their ASAT tests in the 1980s and New Delhi had a steadfast civilian space programme but was compelled to rethink its space orientation following the Chinese ASAT test. The 2007 test set off a new debate within the country on how it should respond to the Chinese ASAT weapon and the implications of the China’s new weapon. Similar debates have been taking place in other countries as well including Japan, which has already invested in interceptor technology.

While ASATs are particularly destructive and considered as inherently destabilizing, there are a range of other counter-space capabilities including cyber and electronic warfare in space that are becoming a more attractive option for states should they want to interfere with or destroy other states’ satellites. Cyber and electronic warfare means have been used in many instances for more than a decade.

There are also other challenges such as emerging new actors as well as non-state players, space debris, crowded orbits triggering radio frequency interferences, issues of spectrum allocation, and problems of access to space, especially for new and emerging players. All of these make space crowded and congested, and access to space more difficult and dangerous. For many developing countries that have just begun to appreciate the use of space in changing the lives of people, getting access to space technology and expertise is still challenging, a reason why they emphasize technology sharing in the context of global governance.

Most of these problems are new. The difference comes from the fact that states have demonstrated greater inclination to develop and use offensive counter-space capabilities intended at creating temporary disruptions in other countries’ satellite operations. This trend is far more visible today than what was witnessed during the Cold War. There have been growing instances wherein cyber and electronic warfare means have been used resulting in temporary disruptions. While no ASAT weapon has yet been used to target space assets, possibly because of immediate and serious consequences, lack of response to instances of cyber and electronic warfare is normalizing bad or irresponsible behaviour. Irrespective of the damage, whether it is temporary or permanent, there must be repercussions. Absence of repercussions could encourage perpetrators to carry on with such attacks. This highlights again the need for identifying clear lines or red lines, beyond which there must be consequences. The red lines must also be disseminated in the public so that the adversaries are also clear that there is a red line they should not cross. In the absence of such articulations, what is increasingly seen is that norms that have prevailed for long are being challenged and/or are broken. The norm to not test ASAT has been broken since January 2007 when China broke a decade-long norm. Similarly, growing instances of the use of other counter-space weapons creating temporary disruptions are also violation of existing norms to not interfere in each other’s satellite operations. Unless these actions are curbed, the danger of normalizing such bad behaviour will be a bigger challenge to address at a later date.

Along with capability developments, countries are also responding in terms of new dedicated military space institutional mechanisms for better civil-military interface as well as to formulate longer term strategies and policy approaches. India went about establishing a Defence Space Agency (DSA) in October 2019 to ensure better coordination between the Department of Space, the Indian military and the Ministry of Defence. Countries such as Australia, Japan, and France have their own debates about how to further integrate space with their military. Meanwhile, other countries who already have such institutions include Russia (Russian Aerospace Defence Forces, 2011), China (People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, 2015), and the US (Space Force, 2019).

Global Governance in a Limbo

The growing space security developments point to the urgent need for new rules of the road. But global governance discussions in the last decade or so have been quite turbulent with some of the recent efforts such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGEs) not even able to produce consensus reports at the end of their deliberations. This is reflective of the fractured nature of the global politics and the great power rivalries that have become antagonistic to the point of not even being able to agree on an outcome document. The inability of all the major space powers to come together to agree on important space security challenges and possible solutions have thwarted solutions.

Outer space is not bereft of any treaties and governing measures, but these came about in a different era when the threats were of a significantly different nature. The primary concerns during the 1960s and 1970s were about nuclear weapons unlike today where non-nuclear and conventional weapons have come to occupy the center-stage. Therefore, the existing legal measures, including the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, are proving to be ineffective in tacking contemporary threats. The OST remains the fundamental treaty measure in ensuring the sanctity of outer space, but it has an important lacuna – the treaty only prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and says nothing about non-WMD weapons. Also, there are a number of new activities being undertaken and new technologies being developed, which are not considered in the OST. Activities, including on-orbit satellite servicing that essentially extends the life of a satellites by remotely repairing or refuelling satellites or technologies such as those to remove space debris, are relatively new and we need new rules to frame the parameters to undertake such activities and moderate the use of these new technologies. While these are defensive and peaceful activities, given the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, such activities are watched with a lot of concern. Finally, there are a broader set of new actors in space including industry players whose roles and responsibilities need to be clear, which help or hinder the process of rule-making. Given the growing presence of industry players in space, there have been efforts to give them a voice at the global governance debates, but this has been challenging.

Whatever form and shape new rules take, the need to identify basic tenets of responsible behaviour cannot be ignored. Given the growth in the number and types of actors, we need new norms and rules that will define and identify clear limits of responsible behaviour in space. One can explore the possibilities of reviewing the existing rules and regulations, but given the fractured nature of global politics, the feasibility of developing a common understanding in how some of the existing measures can be revised will be a non-starter. But it is clear that given the significance of outer space in our daily lives, any disruption will have a far-reaching impact in terms of multiple sectors being affected but also different regions. There are additional complications like how an over-crowded outer space can cause radio-frequency disturbances but because of the heightened sense of competition and rivalry, even a natural event or a mechanical failure could be considered by some state as an intentional attack. This kind of a scenario highlights the urgent need for crisis communications and standard operating procedures to confirm if something was a natural event or an attack.

While there have been several efforts in recent years to formulate new rules and regulations governing outer space activities, none of these have reached any fruitful conclusion. These include the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 2010, the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs), the 2018-19 as well as 2023 UN GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and the 2022-23 Open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours. It is not the lack of understanding of the threats and challenges among the major space powers that there is no progress but there are a couple of other factors that have come to affect today’s state of limbo.

For one, there are philosophical differences in how different countries approach space security challenges and possible solutions. A group of mostly Western countries with the US in the lead believe that political measures including norms of responsible behaviour such as Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) are effective measures under current international political climate when trust and confidence among states are at an all-time low. Given the fractured natured of international politics, the US and a group of countries have felt that developing legal measures may not be a feasible way for the immediate future. A second group of countries led by China and Russia have in the meantime insisted on legal measures as the only effective means to address space security challenges. This assumes that legal measures are like magic bullets and once states sign onto treaties and agreements, all the space security challenges will be dealt with. This is far from the truth as history demonstrates, especially in the Asian context. Finding a compromise between these schools of thought has not been easy.

Two, rule-making exercise has been far more difficult in recent years because unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, when two or three powers worked out what is best and everyone else fell in line, today there are more than eight major space actors and they all want to have a say in how the new rules are written. Developing a consensus in a group of nearly 100 space players is an extraordinary task. Further, the changing balance of power dynamics is unlikely to settle down in the near future, which also means the inflexible stances that major powers have taken so far will continue to hold for a reasonable period of time, making governance debates extremely challenging. Instead, what might be required and feasible is to go for smaller technical agreements that would address various challenges individually than attempt to develop a large comprehensive treaty that might not take off in the near future.


*Author is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Space Exploration and India’s Geoplotical Dilemma

Dhruv Singh Garcha & Krishna Ravishankar*

Keywords:    Artemis Accords – Delhi Declaration of Friendship – Geopolitics – International Lunar Research Station – Space Exploration

Given the rapid growth and advancement in technology, space exploration has moved up the ladder of many countries’ national priorities. With the geopolitical matrix unfolding even while exploring the realm of the cosmos, the American backed Artemis Accords and the Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) project have been the most significant multilateral developments with respect to space governance. This article tries to navigate the path that India as an emerging space power should take which would be beneficial for her space ambitions, keeping in mind her geostrategic interests.

Who Owns Space?

Before looking into the Accord, it is crucial to understand the legalities behind space resource ownership. The chronology begins with the UNGA Declaration of 1963, which debarred claiming sovereignty over celestial bodies. Then came the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, that prohibited the placement of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the establishment of military bases in Space. Furthermore, it laid down minimum regulatory guidelines for resource explorative activities. It was followed by the Moon Agreement of 1979, which refined the regulations entailed in the 1967 treaty and provided for an efficient framework to restrict the exploitation of space resources. However, the letter of the treaties lacks clarity. Article 1 of the 1967 treaty describes outer space as the “province of all mankind.” On the other hand, Article 11 the 1979 agreement describes it as “common heritage of mankind.” This inconsistency has led to long-standing debates about the interpretation and implications of these phrases. The US has always asserted the 1967 treaty’s definition of outer space since it allows for private and state ownership over resources extracted from celestial bodies. Furthermore, it is silent on private ownership over the entire outer space itself, something the Accords are likely to take advantage of. The US’s assertion was further solidified through an executive order dated April 2020 which instructs the Secretary of State to “object to any attempt to treat the 1979 Moon Agreement as expressing customary international law.” This can be said to have acted as the bedrock for the Artemis Accords.

The Artemis Accord

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Artemis Accords encompass a series of bilateral agreements between the US and other states to establish a common vision via a practical set of principles and practices for enhancing the governance of civil exploration and using the outer space to advance the Artemis Program. It further envisages to land the first woman on the Moon by 2024 with participation of both international and commercial players.

The Accords require the nations to ensure that space missions are deployed for non-combat purpose, remain transparent in their plans and policies for space exploration, work towards interoperability of space agencies, make available emergency assistance in space, register Space objects as per the Registration Convention, share scientific data among other signatories, preserve outer space heritage and reduce space debris and ensure minimal waste generation.

The principles are intended to apply to civil space activities of each Signatory by taking appropriate measures such as mission planning and contractual mechanisms.

The Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station Initiative

With Russia dismissing the Accords to be a tool for American hegemony, along with NASA’s ban from collaborating with China in 2011, the Roscosmos signed a partnership with China’s National Space Administration (CNSA) to develop an International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) on the Moon or as Professor Velina Treschokva puts it, “A Dragon-Bear Space Coalition to counter the Eagle.”

In June 2021, the Chinese national space agency released a three-phase plan for the ISRL Project with phase 1 (from 2021-2025) which would collect data and validate “high-precision soft landing” for lunar missions. The second phase or the construction phase (from 2026-2035) would involve two stages with the initial stage involving joint missions, delivering cargo and collection of lunar samples and the second involving construction of lunar and in-orbit. In the third phase, beginning in 2036, crewed landings will begin. The two countries are actively inviting other nations as well, to collaborate and develop the facility.

The Sino-Russian space exploration alliance will certainly be a major rival for the Artemis initiative, considering Russia’s extensive expertise in space technology and China’s resources.

India’s Position with Respect to the Two Blocs

The two geopolitically opposite space exploration programmes have created new dilemmas for India’s lunar governance and ambitions since the decisions it takes will be based on its relations with the pioneers of these blocs.

To understand the complexity of India’s choice with respect to these two blocs, it is vital to look at India’s space collaboration with the blocs’ members, and their diplomatic relations. The reason for doing so is to provide an all-encompassing solution for the scenario since India’s decisions in this regard will inevitably affect its relations with all the countries involved.

India and the Artemis Accords

Lately, there has been an increased level of collaboration between India and the US’ space agencies. India’s first lunar space project, Chandrayaan-1 carried the Moon Minerology Mapping System developed by NASA.

ISRO and NASA are presently working on the NISAR project, which will launch in 2022 and plans to measure the causes and consequences of land surface changes using advanced radar imaging. The two countries have also decided to conclude an MoU on Space Situational Awareness (SSA), creating a framework to protect each other’s satellites from man-made or natural threats.

India’s close bilateral space collaboration with signatories like Japan in the LUPEX Project and Ukraine in the sphere of semi-cryogenic engines also provides a strong backing for India to join this initiative.

From a diplomatic angle, this initiative forms a natural link to the Quad’s Critical and Emerging Technologies Working Group since the US, Japan and Australia are already signatories of the Accords.

Given the recent privatization of space which allows private stakeholders to enter into space-based commercial ventures, the Accord would allow by allowing sharing of technology, access to global supply chains and improving economies of scale to upscale India’s entire business ecosystem, starting from the SMEs to the NewSpace start-up sector.

India and US’ bilateral relations in general have improved significantly as well, culminating into the 2015 Delhi Declaration of Friendship. The 2005 Defence Framework, bilateral security treaties like BECA and COMSCA, and a Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific show the steady partnership between both the countries. Economically speaking, the bilateral trade in 2021 was roughly $145 billion, and the US was the 2nd largest FDI source of India.

India and ISRL

Russian assistance is visible from the inchoate stages of the Indian Space Program, be it the launch of India’s first satellite (Aryabhatta 1), or India’s first human spaceflight mission in 1984.  Moreover, Russia aided India with the provision of cryogenic rockets for its GSLV launchers and is presently training Indian astronauts for the Gaganyaan human spaceflight mission of 2022.

With a long diplomatic history of alliance, the Indo-USSR relationship is important for India’s defence and security needs as evident from the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, 1971. Russia’s support for India’s Permanent UNSC seat, along with its close multilateral collaboration through fora like BRICS and RIC shape the trajectory of this relationship. The Indo-Russian defence partnership is again of vital significance since Russia is India’s largest biggest defence supplier, complemented by prominent military joint exercises. However, Russia’s closer proximity to China and India’s growing alliance with the USA has not augured well for further co-operation.

Coming to China, despite a shared sense of cultural heritage, Sino-Indian political relations have been turbulent, especially over the Line of Actual Control. Given the recent military skirmishes in Eastern Ladakh, the increased Indo-US co-operation and the growing tensions between Washington and Beijing, there have been impediments in deepening the relations. However, from an economic perspective, China is important for India with a bilateral trade of $125 billion in 2021 and more than $4 billion Chinese investments in Indian unicorns.

So, What Now?

Looking at India’s relations with other space powers, it is clear that joining either of these blocs could potentially sabotage India’s strategic diplomatic interests and space ambitions with the other. As of now, India has multiple ongoing collaborations with numerous space agencies across the globe. Therefore, India need not conceptually side with any of the space groupings but rather practice the doctrine of strategic autonomy and make pragmatic collaborations, giving it privileged manoeuvrability across geopolitical blocs.


* Pursuing BA/LLB (Hons.) from National Law University, Jodhpur.