Evaluating the Responsibility of ICAO to Tackle Climate Change

Dr. Deva Prasad M.*

Keywords: CBDR – Chicago Convention – CORSIA – ICAO – UNFCCC

Introduction

International long-haul aviation activity results in significant amount of emissions, leading to dangerous levels of carbon footprints. Needless to say, this significantly high level of carbon emissions has to be controlled. Crafting an effective regulatory framework and institutional mechanism would require us to examine the present global governance mechanism. The global commons nature of climate change raises the question of who will bell the cat, thus, forming a wicked problem. This article provides an overview of shortcomings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 (UNFCCC). The role and responsibility of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the most significant international air law institutional mechanism, is highlighted along with the way forward. 

Present problem

The gravity of the problem caused by the aviation sector’s carbon emissions could be better understood with the statistics, which stipulates that around 15 to 25 per cent of emissions could be traced back to aviation activities by the year 2050.[1] This problem is actuated by the fact that there are currently no scientific and “technological low-carbon alternatives” for aviation fuel and long-haul aviation activities.[2]

Considering that the hyperloop and other mobility solutions have not yet reached the proof-of-concept stage, the double-edged sword issue of lack of feasible technological alternatives and lack of proper regulatory framework for aviation-related carbon emissions continues to trouble the humanity. From the regulatory standpoint, the international law order needs realignment. The UNFCCC provides state-level responsibility to reduce carbon emissions from anthropogenic activities. The UNFCCC preamble clarifies that climate change is a common concern of humankind. It also stipulates that the sovereign States are supposed to enact effective “environmental legislation and environmental standards”. The States are supposed to ensure international cooperation in accordance with international law.

The UNFCCC does not address international aviation issues as sectoral carbon emission control is left to State environmental regulation. The Kyoto Protocol 1997, which talks about the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) carbon trading mechanism, is also silent on the sectoral approaches, including the aviation sector. Even though the UNFCCC acknowledges that the aviation sector’s impact on climate change needs to be tackled as a framework convention mechanism, the sectoral approach and State responsibility must be tapped to make fresh grounds for mitigation action.[3] The UNFCCC mechanism also faces major challenges because the Kyoto Protocol has almost become obsolete. Moreover, the equity and common but differentiated principles under the UNFCCC also haven’t been able to deliver international cooperation as the developed countries have been shrugging away from their higher responsibilities.[4] Hence, problems such as carbon emissions from aviation sectors become embroiled in the regulatory gap.

Even though the members of the international community have placed an ambitious aim of zero carbon trajectory through the Paris Agreement of 2015, the national contributions towards carbon reduction are left to the States to decide. Hence, the Paris Agreement also, in principle, toes the line with the need for national regulations to deal with the sectoral problems.

The present format of addressing carbon emission as a State responsibility through an international convention could tackle the problem only on a partial basis. In this context, the European Union (EU) Member States have also taken the initiative to provide a clear solution using regional arrangements for a sectoral approach. The EU initiative could be considered as a major regulatory development. Academic articles in this regard have clarified that such measures would be considered legally relevant and in consonance with UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and international aviation law. 

Does ICAO have responsibility?

In this regard, the relevance of international aviation law as a field could be analysed with the help of air law conventions and institutional mechanisms. Since the climate change laws have worked only on the concept of State responsibility to determine the sectoral cap for carbon emissions, lex specialis, like international air law, could take significant steps in this direction. The aviation sector is primarily governed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) based on the power vested with it through the Chicago Convention of 1944. As an institutional mechanism that has played a significant role in establishing international cooperation, the responsibility of ICAO needs to be analysed in relation to environmental impacts.

Does the ICAO, as an international institution, have an obligation to tackle climate change? Even though the Chicago Convention does not mention ICAO’s responsibility to tackle environmental issues, we can derive the responsibility based on the broader mandate of ICAO as provided in Article 44 of the Chicago Convention.  ICAO is obligated to ensure “the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation” as provided under Article 44(a) of the Chicago Convention. Moreover, as pointed out, the ICAO could be found to be taking steps to look into sectoral issues as have been highlighted by UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. A complementary step by way of ICAO’s initiatives to tackle climate change and carbon emissions would be helpful for a better global governance framework to evolve. For the sound and economic functioning of the aviation sector, which is also part of the objectives of ICAO as per the preamble to the Chicago Convention, it is relevant to note that the long-term sustainable operation of long-haul flights depends on strong steps to reduce carbon emissions.

How steps initiated by ICAO are ineffective?

Annex 16 of the Chicago Convention talks about environmental protection measures. This forms one of the major technical annexes to the Chicago Convention. Even though Annex 16 deals with environmental protection, the ICAO had not proactively committed to reducing the impact of climate change by effectively evolving technical standards on all aspects of civil aviation. Annex 16 focuses on the issues relating to noise pollution and local air pollution due to aircraft emissions. The requirement of comprehensively addressing the impact of emissions due to long-haul international flights and the need to deal with the environmental impact of aerodromes were neglected by ICAO. The scholarly observations have pointed out the factor of how the ICAO missed the opportunity to include and evolve guidelines pertaining to climate change impact in a comprehensive manner.

While assessing the institutional responsibility perspective of ICAO, the concept of role responsibility is relevant. According to this concept, ICAO needs to act and take proactive initiatives to reduce the impact of the aviation sector on climate change. However, ICAO has fallen short of discharging this obligation, which is detrimental to the core objective of sustainable civil aviation.

In furtherance of Annex 16, the ICAO Assembly undertook the initiative to declare its global commitment towards limiting carbon emissions from international aviation as a measure to tackle climate change in 2010. Moving forward, the ICAO Assembly agreed to the Carbon Offsetting Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) framework in 2016. This is considered as the most significant development in the context of regulatory action from ICAO to combat climate change.

However, CORSIA is not free from loopholes. Critics have often cited that ICAO has shown an immense lack of urgency in tackling the climate change problem. The academic literature also throws open the lack of support provided to the EU emission trading scheme pertaining to the aviation sector.[5] The current CORSIA policy is more of a carbon offsetting than a reduction scheme. Thus, the actual reduction in carbon emissions is being questioned. Moreover, the lack of legal backing for the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) route through which this scheme is being proposed also raises eyebrows regarding the effectiveness of ICAO’s action. The lack of an effective approach to overseeing non-carbon-based emissions, which accelerates climate change, also needs pertinent attention. In this regard, it would also be relevant to note that environmental protection forms an important strategic objective of ICAO, and more proactive action could be expected in activities to reduce climate change impact due to aviation activities.

Analysing the way forward

As Rob Nixon points out the “slow violence concept”,[6] and states that the new perils of long-haul flights are mainly invisible. Hence, the strong urge for regulatory action has yet to be manifested. The success of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 should be understood as an excellent example for ICAO to emulate. The ICAO needs to understand that the long-term economic sustainability of the aviation sector hinges on the regulatory intervention of the ICAO.

At present, ICAO is taking a defensive approach regarding climate change mitigation. The lack of proactive steps needs to be called out. The ICAO Assembly and Council could be used as institutions for re-framing the debate on carbon emission reduction. Though a paradigm shift would be difficult, providing regulatory solutions such as enabling market-linked trading and other nudge mechanisms such as carbon tax/fee or funds for climate change adaptation and enabling technology transfer are feasible options. The fact that the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion in the case of climate change, where the relevance of state obligation has been highlighted, also opens up the way for the UN specialised bodies to take similar advisory opinions to understand more specific sectoral specific responsibilities of the states. Seeking an advisory opinion for ICAO would go a long way in clarifying the extent of responsibility the aviation sector’s specialised UN body needs to consider.

ICAO needs to look at climate change issues more broadly by addressing non-CO2-based emissions, such as nitrous oxide, and their impact on climate change. The myopic approach could be revamped by understanding other dangerous emissions that could cause climate change, and tackling the same through ICAO’s regulatory architecture would be a major achievement in green aviation. 

Applying established principles relating to climate change law, such as the precautionary principle and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), needs to evolve more granularly in the aviation sector. ICAO would benefit immensely from looking at the precautionary principle and how it would be required to change and adopt the aviation sector structurally. Major rehauling of the responsibilities of states would be required if CBDR were to be applied. The Unites States, EU, Japan and other developed countries need to take more carbon emission cuts and work towards shouldering financial and technology transfer arrangements so that other countries can move towards a sustainable aviation model. It is worth highlighting that equal opportunity is a factor mentioned in the Chicago Convention preamble, which needs to be considered by the ICAO in devising an action plan for climate change mitigation. In the proposed CORSIA –is the application of CBDR required for proactive measures from developed nations? This remains a question to be clarified.

ICAO needs to step-up cooperation amongst States and encourage state-level measures to battle the impact of climate change. Optimistically, sustainable aviation as a requirement needs to be well-acknowledged by ICAO, and the required regulatory changes may be envisaged. As emphatically mentioned by Richard Flak, a humane form of global governance is much required.[7]


* Author is an Associate Professor at IIM Kozhikode, Kerala.

References:

[1] Vasavi Thummala and Rahul Hiremath ‘Green Aviation in India: Airline’s Implementation for Achieving Sustainability’, Cleaner and Responsible Consumption, Vol. 7, 2022, p. 100082.

[2] Benoit Mayer and Zhuoqi Ding, ‘Climate Change Mitigation in the Aviation Sector: A Critical Overview of National and International Initiatives’, Transnational Environmental Law, Vol. 12, No.1, 2023, pp. 14 – 41 at p.16.

[3] Article 4 of the UNFCCC mentions the transport sector.

[4] Michal Kolmaš, ‘The Failure of CBDR in Global Environmental Politics’, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2023, pp. 9 – 11 at p. 10.

[5] Malte Petersen, ‘The Legality of the EU’s Stand‐Alone Approach to the Climate Impact of Aviation: The Express Role Given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol’, Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008, pp. 196 – 204  at p. 200.

[6] Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, (Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 5.

[7] Richard Falk., ‘Humane Governance for the World: Reviving the Quest’. Review of International Political Economy,  Vol. 7, No. 2, 2000, pp. 317 – 334 at p. 321.

Spy Balloon and International Law: Has Both China and U.S. Violated International Law?

Dr. Atul Alexander*

Keywords:   ARSIWA – Chicago Convention – Countermeasure – Force Majeure – UN Charter

Recently the United States (U.S) shot down the Chinese High Altitude Balloon (HAB) in the sovereign airspace of the U.S. According to the U.S. Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin, the HAB was deployed to carry out surveillance activities in the continental U.S. The incident forced the Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to comment how China had breached the fundamental principles of international law and also postponed his diplomatic visit to China. 

In the aftermath of the incident, several scholars argued how China violated international law; this post explores how both U.S and China breached international law obligations. The Chinese claim that the balloon was used for civilian purposes for undertaking scientific research. Moreover, it contended that it could not prevent the balloon from drifting because the westerly wind movement influenced the balloon’s scheduled route. As China puts it, the infringement was a case of force majeure. It is without a doubt that the incursion of the balloon tested the boundaries of international law. 

Force Majeure Exception

The initial Chinese statement claims that as the balloon was in distress, it was entitled to enter the U.S. sovereign airspace. Since the balloon was used for civilian purpose (as per Chinese reports) it does not enjoy sovereign immunity.  In terms of distress, Art. 23(1) of Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts states (ARSIWA) states in substance that- the wrongfulness of the act committed by a State is precluded, if the act is due to force majeure, that is, the occurrence was because of irresistible force or unforeseen event, which is beyond the control of the State. This is a scenario wherein the State is compelled to act in a way inconsistent with the international law obligation incumbent upon it. To invoke force majeure, there are three fundamental requirements; (a) the act must be brought because of the irresistible force of nature, (b) it has to be beyond the control of the State, and (c) it becomes materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. Assuming that the balloon drifted because of the westerly winds, it certainly fits into the first requirement. It can be said that the movement of the balloon is beyond the control of the Chinese authorities, and hence, it became materially impossible for China to fulfil the international law obligation. 

The U.S. could assert that China was in breach of the principles under the general international lawand the Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944 (Chicago Convention). State practice reveals that force majeure applies in situations of actual impossibility and not difficulty of performance plea. The International Law Commission (ILC) commentary provided examples of distress to include cases of aircraft entering the airspace of other states because of loss of control or weather. The exception to the said rule is when the State invoking the exception has actively contributed to the material impossibility and thereby accepted the risk of the occurrence of force majeure. As Michel Bourbonniere and Louis Haeck point out, “The overflight of sovereign territory by a state aircraft can be justified by reasons of distress or force majeure as an exception to the principle [that state aircraft cannot flyover the territory of another State…without authorisation.” However, according to Article 8of the Chicago Convention, pilotless aircraft are required to get special authorisation from the contracting State over which the aircraft is flown, this is also espoused by the U.S. statute wherein the federal government maintains exclusive sovereignty over U.S. airspace, and foreign aircraft require permission to navigate.

One of the annexing agreements under the Chicago Convention is the International Air Services Transit Agreement, the agreement provides for multilateral exchanges with regard to the first two freedoms of the air with regard to schedule air services. The Convention and the annexing agreement meant that each State recognized the other’s right to fly through national air space. Although China has denounced the agreement on 11 December 1946, through its note of 3 June  1997, the Chinese Ambassador, stated that the agreement ‘applies to Hong Kong at present, will continue to apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with effect from July 1997.’ Also, by the note dated 8 December 1999, it applied to the Macau region. Moreover, the freedoms mentioned in the Transit Agreement are with respect to scheduled air services. Accordingly, the applicability of rights under the Transit Agreement in this case becomes questionable.

The Legality of United States Actions

As per Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory. Annex VII of the said convention defines an aircraft as “any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.” The definition under the Chicago Convention’s Annex VII includes object lighter or heavier than air and powered or unpowered balloons. Further, paragraph 2.2 of Appendix 5(Annex II) of the Chicago Convention states how an unmanned free balloon used exclusively for meteorological purposes shall not be operated across the territory of another State without appropriate authorisation. Further, paragraph 2.3 provides that authorisation is to be taken prior to launching the balloon if there is a reasonable expectation…that the balloon may drift over the airspace of another State. It is evident from the existing fact that China didn’t get prior authorisation from the U.S.

After the downing of the KAL 007 on 1 September 1983, members of the ICAO assembly adopted Art 3 bis to the Chicago Convention, wherein, if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that an aircraft is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the purpose of the Convention, instructions are to be given to the aircraft to end the violation. In doing so, a State may resort to appropriate means according to relevant rules of international law. In essence, Article 3 bis precludes States from using weapons against intruding aircraft. It is widely agreed that Art 3 bis is a codification of customary international law. Also, the point to be noted is that Art. 3 bis does not intend to modify the rights and obligations of the State under the UN Charter. Therefore, the U.S could attempt to make a valid justification for the use of force under Art. 51 of the UN Charter.

Article 51 permits States to use force for self-defence in case of an armed attack against it.  In the Oil Platforms Case (2003) between Iran and U.S, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) articulated the jurisprudence on ‘armed attack’; accordingly,  it expressed, in exercise of the right of individual self-defence, States have to prove that attack against it is of such a nature to be qualified as an ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of Art. 51. Literal reading of Art. 51 would indicate that an armed attack has to be essentially kinetic in nature. Hence, self-defence taken devoid of a previous act of an armed attack (in a kinetic sense) is untenable. 

Further, to trigger Article. 51, the requirement of proportionality, necessity and immediacy are to be fulfilled. Even if the Chinese Balloon entered U.S. airspace, it did not use force, a prerequisite to trigger Article 51 and to press into application the proportionality and necessity threshold. The ICJ has shed light on the nature of self-defence in the NicaraguaCase (1986); in para 74, the ICJ observed, ‘whether the response to the [armed] attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence’. 

The other reasoning which the U.S may place is anticipatory self-defence, which came into the limelight after the famous Caroline Incident (1837). If the U.S asserts anticipatory self-defence, the defence is shaky because as per Pentagon’s admission, the HAB was “traveling at an altitude well above commercial air traffic and [did] not present a military or physical threat to people on the ground.” If the U.S claims are unjustifiable, this may amount to a blatant breach of a jus cogens norm of prohibition of the use of force; wherein the U.S could incur state responsibility under international law.  At most, this incident could be a case of espionage at par with States deploying submarines conducting spying in the territorial waters. As I have argued previously, espionage per se doesn’t violate international law obligations. In a diplomatic sense, it is implied that States spy on one other. The absence of legal justification under international law can characterise the U.S action as a countermeasure. Countermeasures are justified under certain circumstances, if carried out to make other States cease the violation of international law. However, for invoking countermeasures, there are a plethora of strict requirements like a prior internationally wrongful act of the responsible State against the injured State, notification and offer to negotiate with the responsible State etc. Therefore, the purpose of countermeasure is restoration and not retributive. But the U.S. is yet to make any unambiguous statement on countermeasure. 


* Assistant Professor, The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (WBNUJS). The author would like to thank Prof. (Dr.) Sandeepa Bhat B. for his valuable comments.

Jurisdiction under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention 1944 in the Context of Middle East Conflict

Sandeepa Bhat B.* & Tushar Krishna**

Keywords:  Consultation – Countermeasures – Formalistic approach – Negotiation – Riyadh Agreements

Background

In 2013 and 2014, the Gulf Cooperation Council had undertaken specific instruments, known as “Riyadh Agreements”, under which Qatar and other middle eastern States have made commitments to establish peace. During June 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt alleged that Qatar has failed to adhere to its commitments under Riyadh Agreements, and thereby, they resorted to take certain countermeasures to make Qatar comply with its commitments. These countermeasures included airspace restrictions for the Qatar registered aircrafts, which triggered Qatar filing an application before the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention 1944. While the ICAO Council assumed jurisdiction and decided the case in June 2018, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt (herein after “the appellants”) appealed against this decision to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The appellants contended the lack of jurisdiction of the ICAO Council as well as inadmissibility of Qatar’s claims. However, the ICJ rejected the appeal and held that ICAO Council’s exercise of jurisdiction was valid, and Qatar’s application to the ICAO Council was admissible. This decision of the ICJ has brought forward two prominent issues in the ICAO dispute settlement mechanism, which are addressed hereunder.

Scope of Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council

One of the primary grounds of appeal in this case has been on the ICAO Council’s exercise of jurisdiction, which according to the appellants was beyond the scope of its authorization. Text of Article 84 clearly states that “If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council.” Since the “countermeasures” taken by the appellants in this case against Qatar for the violation of Riyadh Agreements are under the broader domain of public international law, it is not a subject matter under the Chicago Convention, and therefore, the ICAO Council is argued to have no jurisdiction in this case. Thus, the question is how the ICAO council can decide the lawfulness of the countermeasures, as it is not competent to assess it holistically?

The ICJ has observed that “the prospect that a respondent would raise a defence based on countermeasures in a proceeding on the merit […] does not in and of itself have any effect on […] jurisdiction”. The Court referred to its finding in India v. Pakistan Case. However, Berman J. in his separate opinion mentions the need to understand the limits of ICAO Council’s jurisdiction and states that “the invocation of a broader legal defence cannot expand the Council’s competence”. The majority opinion denied such a finding and went by the argument that for reaching a proper decision on the disputes falling within its jurisdiction, the ICAO Council is entitled to examine certain issues falling outside the matter of civil aviation. Thus, the ICJ held that the integrity of the ICAO Council’s dispute settlement functions would not be lost simply because it examined the issues outside the scope of Chicago Convention for discharging its essential obligations under the Chicago Convention. Although it may appear that this is a rare instance where the Court has so clearly asserted the expansive approach of the adjudicatory body’s ratione materiae, it is nothing but the Court’s conformity with the recent jurisprudence it has raised. For example, in Nuclear Test Case, the Court observed that “an adjudicative body can make necessary findings to ensure its exercise of jurisdiction over the merits of the case”.

This debate on the limits of jurisdiction is not just found at the ICAO Council’s level but also at different other international adjudicatory bodies’ level. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is one of the classic examples in this regard, wherein the questions have arisen as to whether the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is having jurisdiction only with respect to covered agreements or can the DSB deal with public international law or domestic law issues whenever they are closely connected with the international trade law issues. In the Mexico Soft Drinks case, the Appellant Body observed that it is not on the WTO panels to decide on the non-WTO disputes, and thus, it cannot adjudicate an internationally wrongful act in the context of defence of countermeasures. However, as a general rule the WTO jurisprudence has tilted in favour of exercising the jurisdiction in environmental issues, public health aspects, personal laws etc while deciding the trade disputes. Though the WTO DSB has gone in favour of more inclusive jurisdiction, it has resulted in a serious crisis. This expansive approach is said to be one of the primary reasons for the United States blocking the appointments to the Appellate Body, and thereby, paralyzing a vibrant dispute settlement mechanism. Thus, the larger question here is whether such an expansive approach would put the principle of consent (of parties to the treaties) into a threat as it provides a back door entry for those issues that were either not negotiated or not agreed upon.

Negotiation under Article 84

The second major issue is relating to the precondition of negotiation before referring the dispute to the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. This precondition is supplemented by Article 2(g) of the ICAO Rules for the Settlement of Differences (ICAO Rules), which states that a party submitting a dispute to the ICAO Council must attach a memorial containing “a statement that negotiations to settle the disagreement had taken place between the parties but were not successful.” However, Qatar didn’t put forward a formal request for ‘negotiation’ to any of the appellants under Article 84, rather there were some general attempts made either by means of Qatar referring the disputes to third States and also seeking for consultation under the WTO regime or by virtue of the ICAO Council trying to allow negotiation between the parties after the dispute was referred to it. Moreover, Qatar also failed to comply with Article 2(g) of the ICAO Rules by not including the requisite statement in the memorial. Hence, the appellants argued that Qatar’s case was inadmissible.

Interestingly, the efforts made by Qatar, though not formal under Article 84, were held by both the ICAO Council and the ICJ to be sufficient to meet the requirement of negotiation in the context of circumstances involving appellants’ unwillingness to negotiate. Though the ICJ reiterated that Article 84 applies with regard to “only those disputes which cannot be settled through negotiation” and this precondition “must be satisfied to establish court’s jurisdiction”, it went by the lower threshold for satisfying this precondition. A genuine attempt for negotiation by the disputing party is said to be sufficient, and failure of negotiation is supposed to be understood as a lower threshold of “theoretical impossibility’ rather than a higher threshold of “no reasonable probability of further negotiation leading to a settlement”. On the issue of failure to comply with the requirement of Article 2(g) of the ICAO Rules, the ICJ referred to the part of Qatar’s application and memorial mentioning “A statement of attempted negotiations”, wherein Qatar blamed that the appellants did not permit any opportunity to negotiate on aviation restrictions. This statement along with the confirmation of the Secretary General that Qatar’s application complied in form with the requirements under Article 2 of the ICAO Rules was found to be sufficient by the ICJ in ruling in favour of Qatar.

This leads us to the question- when a treaty is specifically asking for negotiation as a specific mechanism, isn’t it imperative on the States to invoke it formally to arrive at an amicable settlement? Again when we draw parallel from the WTO dispute settlement, we can find that Article 4 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) specifies the mandatory requirement of consultation between the disputing parties before invoking the jurisdiction of the WTO panels. This mandate has been for ensuring that the parties would get sufficient opportunity to discuss their concerns and reach a mutually acceptable solution. This mandate under Article 4 of the DSU is rigid, formal and indispensable, and it cannot be satisfied in an indirect way as Qatar is said to have complied with in the present case. Hence, the essence of such consultation under the DSU is that a party having any concern must notify the other party/ies concerned formally for consultation under Article 4 of the DSU by stipulating the specific provision/s involved under the WTO Agreements. Due to such a formalistic approach, several trade disputes end at this consultation stage itself as the parties understand the concerns expressed by each other through consultation. This shows the effectiveness of the consultation process, if followed under a formalistic approach.

Similar to the process of consultation, negotiation gives scope for parties to remove any misunderstanding by way of clarifying their concerns. Indeed, the ICJ in the present case had accepted the references to negotiation by Qatar, which were in bits and pieces without any one formalistic reference of negotiation under Article 84. This leads to the question that if the Court is accepting such a lower threshold for satisfying the precondition of negotiation, isn’t it impacting the purpose behind such a precondition? It appears that such a lower threshold of compliance would ignite distrust among the parties in the absence of direct communications, and thereby, fail to bring an understanding of the situation that the parties are undergoing. Hence, a more formalistic approach to negotiation, especially with its increased significance as an alternative dispute settlement mechanism, is required under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention to ensure amicable settlement of disputes.


* Professor of Law & Director – Centre for Aviation and Space Laws, The WB National University of Juridical Sciences, Sec. III, Salt Lake City, Kolkata.

** Member – Centre for Aviation and Space Laws, The WB National University of Juridical Sciences, Sec. III, Salt Lake City, Kolkata.